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ABSTRACT 
 The role of intellectual property (IP) rights, such as patents, in innovation is the 
subject of an ongoing debate. Using a sudden shift in the patentability of genomic 
compounds, this dissertation contributes new evidence to this debate by shedding light on 
three different roles that patents can play in innovative processes. In three complementary 
essays, I examine the impact of patents on follow-on innovations, markets for 
technology, and scientific research. Compiling data on the population of patents on 
isolated genes, I show that their sudden invalidation has increased innovation in 
commercialized diagnostic tests, but decreased the cooperative agreements among the 
biopharmaceutical firms. I further show that these effects are heterogeneous across firms 
and markets. The results of my analyses, however, present no significant evidence of 
patents hindering the scientific progress. The findings of this study provide novel 
contribution to a vigorous academic debate on IP rights and inform policy by discussing 
the consequences of a recent high-profile ruling on the patent-eligibility of genomic 
compounds. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Intellectual Property (IP) rights confer limited-term rights on innovators to 
exclude others from using their innovations. Since markets often fail to incentivize 
innovation, IP rights aim to provide incentives for innovators to invest in research and 
development and offer them a way to recoup their costs. Their function in the free 
markets, however, has not been far from controversy. In different periods of time, the 
opponents of the IP rights system have called for its reform or occasionally its total 
abolishment. Fritz Machlup and Edith Penrose (1950) trace the history of IP rights 
controversy back to 1850s. In 1850, an editorial in Economist, for instance, reads: 
“Before . . . [the inventors] can . . . establish a right of property in their inventions, they 
ought to give up all the knowledge and assistance they have derived from the knowledge 
and inventions of others. That is impossible, and the impossibility shows that their minds 
and their inventions are, in fact, parts of the great mental whole of society, and that they 
have no right of property in their inventions, except that they can keep them to 
themselves if they please and own all the material objects in which they may realize their 
mental conception” (Machlup and Penrose, 1950). Despite its old age, this controversy 
around the functioning of IP rights is far from conclusive. New York Times, for instance, 
published an article in January 2016 that called for “ending patent monopolies on 
drugs”1. 
                                                        
1 https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2015/09/23/should-the-government-impose-drug-price-
controls/end-patent-monopolies-on-drugs 
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In response to this debate, a rich research stream on IP rights has emerged in the 
literature on Economics, Management, and Law (Arrow, 1962; Nordhaus, 1967; Kitch, 
1977; Merges & Nelson, 1990; Scotchmer, 1991; Green & Scotchmer, 1995; Heller & 
Eisenberg, 1998; Arora et al., 2001; Gans & Stern, 2003; Hall, 2007; Boldrin & Levine, 
2008; Bessen & Maskin, 2009). According to this literature, in designing the IP rights 
system, generally three factors should be considered: 1) the incentives that the limited-
term exclusion rights provide for innovators, 2) the deadweight loss due to higher prices 
while the IP is in place, and 3) the limitations that granting IP create for follow-on 
innovators (Nordhaus, 1969; Scotchmer, 1991). To ensure the functioning of the IP rights 
system, the trade-offs generated by these factors need to be balanced. The empirical 
evidence on whether and how this balance could be achieved in different contexts are 
more recent and more importantly, provide mixed findings. In the life sciences industry, 
for instance, while Walsh, Arora, and Cohen (2003) and Sampat and Williams (2019) 
find no evidence of patents on biological products hindering follow-on innovations, 
Murray and Stern (2007), Williams (2013), and Murray, Aghion, Dewatripont, Kolev, 
and Stern (2016) find a strong chilling effect of IP rights on follow-on science and 
commercialization.  
This dissertation aims to contribute new empirical evidence to this debate by 
taking advantage of a wholesome withdrawing of gene patents, following the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s ruling over the Association of Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics 
case (hereafter the Myriad case) in June 2013. In three complementary essays, I explore 
whether and how this shift in the patentability of genetic compounds affected 
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entrepreneurial and innovative activities in the biopharmaceutical and medical 
diagnostics industries. As summarized below, Chapter 2 focuses on the legal shift on new 
product introductions. The data I have assembled enable me to identify gene patents and 
estimate the effects that withdrawing their patent protection had on the development of 
new gene-based diagnostic tests. I find a significant increase in the development of new 
genetic diagnostic tests after the invalidation of gene patents, which I interpret as 
evidence of the hindering impact of upstream patents on downstream commercialization 
in diagnostics. More importantly, I find that following the withdrawal of gene patents, 
entrepreneurial firms are more active in introducing novel diagnostic tests. They also 
direct their innovative activities from peripheral markets towards central markets; further 
evidence of patents not only affecting the rate of follow-on innovations, but also the 
direction of the innovative activities. 
Chapter 3 explores the impact of the gene patent invalidation on the cooperative 
commercialization activities among organizations through the markets for technology. 
The markets for technology expand the strategy space for innovators, enabling them to 
consider technology licensing as a potential source of revenue. The extant literature on 
technology markets highlights the importance of IP rights for the functioning of these 
markets. However, the empirical evidence on the role that IP rights play in facilitating the 
functioning of technology markets is limited. This chapter employs a difference-in-
difference framework to estimate the causal impact of gene patents’ invalidation on 
technology licensing rates. I find the invalidation of gene patents to have a strong, 
persistent, and negative impact on the annual technology licensing deals of the affected 
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organizations. Building on the market design literature, I also provide evidence of the 
heterogeneity of this impact across different therapeutic markets. 
 Finally, in Chapter 4, I exploit the shift in the patentability of human genes as an 
important scientific research input to estimate its impact on the rate and direction of 
scientific progress – a topic of ongoing debate in the policy arena. Specifically, I explore 
these impacts on gene-related publication rates, research grants, and scope breadth of 
scientific papers. My analyses show no evidence of impact on the general level of 
scientific activities. I only find a non-significant impact when focusing on high impact 
factor journals. I find that after the invalidation of gene patents, the level of gene-related 
scientific activities has increased in the high impact factor journals, although their rates 
have not changed substantially.  
This dissertation aims to contribute to a rich literature on proprietary rights and 
innovation. Using an important shift in the patentability of DNA compounds, I run multi-
level analyses of a large set of gene-related data and document evidence of different 
impacts on the development of new commercialized diagnostic products, the cooperative 
agreements among biopharmaceuticals, and the scientific progress in the field of 
genomics. My findings shed light on a variety of innovation aspects in which patents may 
play a role. 
In addition, my findings could inform policy about the consequences of a 
controversial ruling on the patentability of genomic compounds. Recent years have 
witnessed an increase in the debates among the proponents and opponents of IP rights, 
particularly evident in a set of high-profile rulings on patent-eligibility of different 
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subject matters (e.g. Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, 
Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, and Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank 
International). As noted by Caulfield et al. (2013), in several cases, the needed empirical 
evidence for advising policymakers is sparse or lacking and the policy is informed by 
speculations and anecdotes. As a causal analysis of a large-scale, carefully-identified 
data, this dissertation intends to contribute to the conversation in the policy arena as well. 
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PROPRIETARY RIGHTS AND MARKET ENTRY:  EVIDENCE FROM 
INVALIDATED GENE PATENTS 
INTRODUCTION 
IP rights, such as patents, are designed to motivate innovation by helping 
innovators secure higher returns on their risky R&D investments. Whether they 
effectively fulfill their purpose, however, remains the subject of an ongoing debate. 
While a well-established literature dating back at least to Machlup and Penrose (1950) 
and Kitch (1977) suggests that patents could encourage innovation, research on 
cumulative innovation (Scotchmer, 1991) documents evidence that IP rights impede 
innovation, particularly in the cases where IP rights are widely distributed among owners 
(Heller & Eisenberg, 1998). 
When empirically testing these seemingly contrasting theories, IP rights in the life 
sciences have received special attention. Survey evidence is particularly strong in arguing 
that patents are important for protecting innovation in life sciences (Levin et al., 1987; 
Cohen et al., 2000; Graham et al., 2009). In life sciences industries, large-scale empirical 
analysis, however, finds mixed results. For example, Walsh, Arora, and Cohen (2003) 
find no evidence that patents on research materials hinder scientific progress. Similarly, 
Sampat and Williams (2019) find that patenting genes do not have a discernible effect on 
the development of follow-on commercialized products. By contrast, Murray and Stern 
(2007), Murray et al. (2016), and Williams (2013) document a negative impact of IP 
rights on follow-on research and innovation. Even within the life sciences, empirical 
evidence on whether IP rights stimulate or stifle innovation, therefore, remains 
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controversial. More importantly, we still know little about how patents shape the 
dynamics of innovative activities across different types of firms and markets.   
To address these questions, this paper examines the impact of a specific type of 
patent that claims isolated human genes on subsequent innovation. I exploit an 
unexpected and sudden shift in the patent-eligibility of patented human genes following 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling on the Myriad case. In June 2013, the U.S. Supreme 
Court ruled in the Myriad case that genes that are isolated from DNA are parts of nature 
and therefore are not patent eligible. The ruling, however, excluded another type of 
genomic compound called complementary DNAs (cDNAs) on the grounds that these 
compounds are synthesized in the lab and are not naturally occurring. I take advantage of 
this feature to create a control group of patented human genes that are comprised of both 
an isolated gene as well as a cDNA, and thus could retain some patent protection after the 
Myriad case. This creates a baseline of comparison with a treatment group consisting of 
the patented human genes, for which there is only an isolated gene and therefore lost 
patent protection after the ruling. Based on data from the population of gene patents 
active at the time of the ruling, I analyze the impact of the patent withdrawal decision on 
the introduction of new diagnostic tests for each patented gene. I find a strong increase in 
the annual number of new genetic tests after the invalidation of gene patents.  
Further, I investigate whether the influence of IP rights on innovation is the same 
across all firms and markets. Novel to the debate is my analyses of firms and markets 
downstream in the value chain subsequent to gene patent invalidation. To explore the 
heterogeneity in the impact across firms and markets, I first make a distinction between 
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new diagnostic tests developed by entrepreneurial firms and those created by established 
firms; I examine the potential differential impacts that patents may have on startups 
relative to incumbents. I find that startups are the primary drivers of downstream 
innovations following the invalidation of upstream gene patents. Second, I separate the 
gene-based diagnostic markets into two groups: central markets, which are characterized 
by high demand for diagnostic tests, and peripheral markets, in which there is less 
demand for genetic tests. Extant literature shows evidence of firms using patents to 
increase their market power in central markets (Ceccagnoli, 2009) and I explore whether 
patents affect these markets differently as compared to peripheral markets. I find a 
significant increase in innovation in central markets, where as innovations in peripheral 
markets present no significant change. Finally, I combine the four subsamples to 
investigate the potential market entries by entrepreneurial and established firms and find 
that startups move their focus of innovation to central markets while in the other three 
subsamples, I do not find evidence of significant changes.  
This study contributes new evidence to the theoretical debate on the innovation-
stimulating versus the innovation-stifling impact of IP rights. The results lend support to 
the notion that patents on upstream innovation inputs can impede subsequent downstream 
innovations. Following the sudden invalidation of gene patents, a larger number of new 
methods of diagnostic testing is developed for the genes that lost patent protection 
compared to the genes that partially retained such rights as cDNA. These downstream 
innovative activities are primarily driven by entrepreneurial firms, while the impact of the 
withdrawal of isolated gene patents on established firms appears to be indiscernible. I 
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interpret this finding as evidence that patents disproportionately deter innovation by 
startups relative to established firms. Following the invalidation of upstream patents, 
startups are more motivated to develop their own novel innovations, whereas established 
companies seem to be not impacted, discernibly. My results also show that after the 
patent invalidation of isolated genes, firms move from peripheral markets toward more 
central markets characterized by higher consumer demand. This finding reveals another 
feature of patents on upstream innovations: this form of IP protection pushes 
entrepreneurial innovation to peripheral markets while central markets experience lower 
rates of entrepreneurial innovation. After the withdrawal of patents on genes, the locus of 
innovation in diagnostics shifts from peripheral toward central markets. 
This research makes contributions in several areas. First, it is the result of a large-
scale data effort to carefully link upstream patents to downstream innovations and 
examine the impacts from a plausibly exogenous shift in patenting. The extant literature 
presents the empirical challenges associated with directly measuring innovation and 
linking it to IP rights. To overcome these challenges, several studies have used noisy 
measures, such as patents and publications, to proxy for innovation. Collecting data on 
actual downstream commercialized products, gene-based diagnostic tests, allows me to 
avoid the shortcomings associated with these noisy measures. I, however, am not the first 
to use diagnostic tests to measure innovation. This work hugely borrows from and builds 
on research by Williams (2013) and Sampat and Williams (2019). In particular, the 
present study complements and extends recent work by Sampat and Williams (2019) that 
compares follow-on innovation patterns for genes in approved patent applications with 
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genes for which the patent applications were rejected. In the diagnostic sector, Sampat 
and Williams find no significant differences in innovation between the two groups, which 
they interpret as evidence of a functioning market for technology in this sector that allows 
for somewhat efficient licensing. While they measure innovation as whether a 
downstream diagnostic test exists for an upstream gene, my study examines the annual 
number of new diagnostic tests developed per gene before and after the withdrawal of 
gene patents following the Myriad case. Specifically, my results show that after the 
invalidation of patents on human genes, diagnostic firms strongly increase their efforts to 
employ new methods of genetic testing. Moreover, the panel data set of new diagnostic 
test developments that I assemble, as compared to the cross-sectional data available to 
Sampat and Williams (2019), enables me to trace the patterns of innovation over time. 
Second, this study contributes to strategy and entrepreneurship literature by 
exploring the heterogeneity of innovation efforts in startups and established firms, and 
across central and peripheral markets. There are established theoretical arguments 
confirming that startups respond differently to upstream patent enforcement relative to 
incumbents, which find support in empirical studies (see for example Lerner, 1995; 
Agarwal, Ganco, Ziedonis, 2009; Galasso and Schankerman, 2015). The present study 
provides further evidence that in the presence of upstream patents, downstream startups 
are disproportionately handicapped in innovation relative to their established 
counterparts. Following the invalidation of these patents, startups become the main 
drivers of downstream innovation. Also, startups particularly increase their innovative 
activities in high-potential, large, central markets. 
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Finally, this paper provides the first systematic evidence regarding the innovation 
and market entry outcomes associated with a landmark legal case affecting U.S. patent 
rights. More than five years after the U.S. Supreme Court withdrew patent protection 
from isolated genes, this study demonstrates the consequences of this decision for the 
development of diagnostic tests and its costs and benefits for entrepreneurial and 
established diagnostic firms. Before the Supreme Court announced its decision on the 
Myriad case, several academics and practitioners raised concerns about the lack of 
empirical evidence to inform on the potential implications of the decision (Caulfield et 
al., 2013). This study illustrates part of the Myriad case's impacts on the diagnostic 
sector, which could speak to other policy decisions on IP rights as well. 
 The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes the theoretical arguments. 
Section 3 introduces the empirical context, the collected data set, and the empirical 
methodology, while Section 4 presents the results. Section 5 provides robustness checks 
and Section 6 discusses the limitations of the research. Section 7 concludes. 
 
 
THEORY 
Competitive markets often fail to incentivize innovations effectively. IP rights 
such as patents are designed to address this shortcoming by rewarding the innovator with 
a limited-term monopoly over the use of the innovation in a commercial product. A 
foundational challenge, however, arises due to the cumulative nature of innovation 
(Scotchmer, 1991). In most cases, innovation does not happen in isolation, but as a result 
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of a step-by-step process of improvement where each innovation builds upon the prior 
innovations to develop a novel product. In such a process, patents can play a decisive 
role, particularly when they are granted to the upstream R&D inputs on which 
downstream commercialization is based.  
Gene patents are an example of such patents protecting upstream materials. In 
gene-based diagnostic testing, for instance, the test provider needs to compare the genetic 
sequence of the patient with a database of normal genes to detect suspicious additions, 
deletions, or substitutions of the gene sequence. Such a comparison allows the provider to 
predict whether and the extent to which the patient is susceptible to a genetic disorder. 
This practice, however, could infringe upon the patent rights of the corresponding gene 
patent owner. Licensing the patent is a solution to this potential infringement problem. 
Nevertheless, the gene patent owners may potentially have the upper hand in licensing 
negotiations, enabling them to charge high royalty fees (Shapiro, 2000; Lemley & 
Shapiro, 2006) or even block the downstream diagnostic firm from access or use. In such 
cases, upstream patents may substantially disincentivize and limit the introduction of 
novel gene testing methods with higher accuracy and lower prices for the patented genes. 
Sampat and Williams (2019) test for the potential impacts that gene patents have 
on follow-on innovations. They use the patent examiner leniency as an instrument to 
measure the impact of granting a patent on subsequent innovations, and find that gene 
patents do not have a discernible impact on innovations measured by both the existence 
of a gene-based diagnostic test and the use of the gene as a therapeutic product. They 
interpret their findings as evidence of licensing working well in the gene-based diagnostic 
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sector so that gene patents do not impede follow-on innovations in downstream. This 
result contrasts with the findings of Murray and Stern (2007), Murray et al. (2016) and 
Williams (2013) that show patent and non-patent forms of IP over biomedical research 
inputs have negative impacts on the rates of scientific research and commercialized 
products. 
In this paper, I build on these prior studies and inform the debate by measuring 
innovation at a more granular level and over time. While Sampat and Williams (2019) 
examine downstream innovation in diagnostics as whether a gene-based diagnostic test 
(any diagnostic test) exists in the market for the corresponding gene at the cross-sectional 
level, I am able to assemble a panel of diagnostic tests, separated by the clinics that 
develop them and the timestamp of when they are created. This enables me to track 
incremental innovations in gene-based diagnostic testing, in the form of novel methods of 
testing per gene, over time. This also allows me to employ a difference-in-differences 
framework to estimate the impact of withdrawing upstream patents on downstream 
genetic testing. Furthermore, using the data at the firm and market levels, I am able to ask 
new questions on the heterogenous impacts that gene patents may have on different types 
of companies and in different therapeutic areas.  
Drawing on the literature on cumulative innovation (Scotchmer, 1991; Heller & 
Eisenberg, 1998), I predict patents over isolated genomic compounds to hinder follow-on 
innovations in downstream gene-based diagnostic testing. Before the Myriad case, I 
expect these upstream patents to have a chilling effect on downstream R&D investment 
and subsequently impede the development of novel methods of genetic testing. Following 
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the invalidation of isolated gene patents after the Myriad case, I expect to see higher rates 
of innovation for the genes that lost patent protection as compared to the genes that 
retained their cDNA claims. 
 
The Differential Impact of Patents on Entrepreneurial and Established Firms 
My second set of predictions deals with the role of patents in shaping the competitive 
dynamics of innovation. Empirical evidence suggests that patents are a more effective 
tool in hindering small firms from infringement relative to their established counterparts. 
When a strong patent rights regime is in place, entrepreneurial firms are generally more 
cautious about not infringing on patented innovations (Lerner, 1995; Agarwal, Ganco, & 
Ziedonis, 2009). Their capital constraints and limited experience in patent litigation 
processes make the litigation particularly costly for startups, encouraging firms to take 
proactive measures to avoid areas where the risk of infringement is high. Lerner (1995), 
for example, shows that biotechnology startups are especially wary of the technology 
fields in which incumbents with lower overall litigation cost firms are granted patents. 
In the case of infringement where there is a threat of a lawsuit, also, 
entrepreneurial firms are disproportionately handicapped. Lanjouw and Schankerman 
(2004) document evidence of smaller firms being at a disadvantage when dealing with 
lawsuits. In the conventional solutions to avoid courts in patent disputes, such as cross-
licensing, entrepreneurial firms with their small patent portfolios have the lower hand. 
Siegelman and Waldfogel (1999) show that low bargaining power reduces the chances of 
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settling patent infringement disputes cooperatively and increases the risks of lawsuit 
threats for entrepreneurial firms with lower negotiation power.  
Moreover, it could be more difficult for startups to find capital sources to fund 
their litigation costs (Agarwal et al., 2009; Lanjouw & Lerner, 2001). Legal disputes 
often consume a nontrivial portion of startups’ time, managerial focus, and financial 
resources and could discourage venture capitalists and angel investors from channeling 
money into the startups. While public companies have broader authority in using their 
financial resources, entrepreneurial firms’ hands are relatively tied in financial sourcing, 
and they may find it difficult to persuade the venture capitals to fund their legal disputes 
(Nasheim, 2000; Agarwal et al., 2009).    
I expect, therefore, the withdrawal of patent protection from isolated genes to be a 
more consequential shift for entrepreneurial firms, vis-à-vis incumbents. After the Myriad 
case, I anticipate startups to be more active in entering the markets formerly dominated 
by the incumbents and protected by patents. 
 
The Differential Impact of Patents on Entries into Peripheral and Central Markets 
Along with the increase in activities of entrepreneurial firms, patent withdrawal may also 
influence their specific market activities. I expect their downstream innovation activities 
be more inclined toward central markets, which are characterized by high consumer 
demand. Incumbents have traditionally used patents as a means to control markets. 
Calabrese et al. (2000) show that the incumbents in the Canadian biotechnology industry 
exploit their patents, together with their alliance portfolios, to deter entrepreneurial 
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activities. They find that the aggregation of patents, particularly when concentrated in the 
hands of only a few incumbents, can significantly discourage founding and decrease the 
survival rates of entrepreneurial firms. In central markets incumbents rely more on 
patents to stabilize the market and inhibit entry. Testing their hypotheses in the IT 
industry, Cockburn and MacGarvie (2006) report that the existence of more patents in a 
market can significantly reduce the hazard of entry. Ceccagnoli (2009) further shows that 
in central markets where incumbents enjoy above-normal returns, they may engage in 
preemptive patenting to prevent entry by the firms that could offer improved or substitute 
products. Such activities could bar outsiders from entering central markets and especially 
push entrepreneurial firm toward peripheral markets. When upstream patent rights are 
withdrawn, therefore, I expect innovative activities to be targeted toward central markets. 
Overall, following the withdrawal of patent protection from upstream innovations, 
I predict the downstream commercialized innovations to be driven by entrepreneurial 
firms and be aimed toward more central markets. 
 
 
DATA AND METHODS 
In this paper, I first examine the impact that the withdrawal of patents on isolated 
genes has on diagnostic innovation. Next, I explore the heterogeneity of the impact for 
entrepreneurial and established firms and across central and peripheral markets. My 
empirical strategy is to first construct a data set of the entire set of patented genes and 
assign them to two groups of treatment, comprising the gene patents that only claim the 
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isolated gene and do not have any claims on the cDNA, and control, comprising the gene 
patents that claim both the isolated gene and the cDNA. As part of their decision on the 
Myriad case, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld patent eligibility for cDNA claims, allowing 
the patents owners who claimed cDNAs as well as isolated genes to partially retain patent 
protection since cDNA was a synthetic creation and not found in nature. I use this feature 
to create a baseline sample for comparison of genes that did not completely lose their 
patent protection with those that did entirely lose their patent rights. 
Second, I compare the development of new diagnostic tests between the two 
groups, namely firms that lost patent protection and those that did not, before and after 
the Myriad case. I interpret the potential difference between the two as evidence of the 
impact that upstream patents have on downstream innovation in the clinical diagnostic 
setting. Finally, I explore the heterogeneity of the impact across firms and markets. 
 For the Myriad case to be an eligible quasi-experimental setting, at least two 
conditions should be satisfied. First, the treatment and control groups should be 
comparable before the ruling is announced. Second, the ruling should be surprising for 
the patent owners; anticipating the outcome of the case beforehand could help the gene 
patent owners take measures to mitigate the costs to their businesses, potentially leading 
to the endogenous selection of outcomes based on predictions. In the section below, I 
provide evidence of the “pre-ruling parallel trends” and the “element of surprise” in the 
Myriad case. 
This section further describes the data construction, empirical methodology, and 
descriptive statistics of the data set. To test my theoretical predictions, I compile the 
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population of the patented genes before the Myriad case and merge it with data on their 
corresponding diagnostic tests. I then use a difference-in-differences estimator to estimate 
the impact of withdrawing patents on DNA compounds on the innovation of these genetic 
tests. 
 
Data Construction 
I first assemble the population of patent-claimed human genomic compounds. From the 
universe of U.S. patents, I identify and collect the patents that contain human genomic 
sequences. I limit the sample to the genes that are explicitly mentioned in the patent 
claims and confer IP rights on the patent owner. I link each genomic sequence to its 
corresponding gene to identify the associated gene-based diagnostic tests. Following 
Jensen and Murray (2005), I collect the patented DNA sequences from the National 
Center for Biotechnology Information (NCBI), totaling 10,602,933 DNA sequences. The 
Basic Local Alignment Search Tool (BLAST) is used to align the sequences with the 
human messenger RNA (mRNA) database (Zhang et al. 2000) and I select only those 
sequences that are at least 180 nucleotides in length and contain the term “homo sapiens” 
and are precisely aligned with the human genome (e-value = 0.00). 
 For this study, it is key to select only the genomic sequences that are claimed in 
the patent documents. To limit my sample to the claimed sequences, I download the full 
text of patent claims from the USPTO's Patent Research data set and identify the 
nucleotide sequences in patent claims. I then merge these sequences with the large 
population of gene sequences in U.S. patent documents and omit the expired patents, 
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which results in 3,536 genes claimed in patents granted between 1994 and 2013. I assign 
the genes with the term cDNA in their patent claims to the control group and the rest to 
the treatment group. 
 To construct the outcome variable, I combine the gene patent data set with 
NCBI's Genetic Testing Registry (GTR) database and link each gene to the annual 
number of corresponding new gene-based diagnostic tests developed between 2011 and 
2016. GTR provides the development dates of genetic tests. For my measure to map 
squarely onto the proposed outcome variable, new gene-based diagnostic tests, I only 
include the tests that use a new method of testing for the associated gene in my data set.  
To explore heterogeneity, I construct two variables. First, I separate diagnostic firms into 
two categories: startups and established. Following Agarwal, Ganco, and Ziedonis 
(2009), I assign the firms aged five years and younger to the startup category and the rest 
to the established. I build my market centrality variable using the World Health 
Organization's (WHO’s) Global Burden of Diseases (GBD) report in 2017 for the U.S. 
Specifically, following Lanjouw and Cockburn (2001) and Vakili and McGahan (2015), I 
use the Disability-Adjusted Life Years (DALYs) to find the potential market size per 
gene. I link genes and DALYs by finding the associated genes with each disease, 
multiplying the disease DALY by the gene-disease association score, and then 
aggregating these adjusted DALYs per gene. This procedure produces a measure of 
potential market size for genes, giving higher weights to the genes that are associated 
with more diseases, or with diseases with larger DALYs, or both. I assign genes with the 
top 25 percent of cumulative DALYs to the central market group and the rest to the 
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peripheral market group. I compile data on diseases from www.disgenet.org that provides 
one of the largest databases of gene-disease associations (Pinero et al. 2016). To 
accurately combine WHO’s DALYs with Disgenet’s diseases, I use the U.S. National 
Library of Medicine’s Unified Medical Language System (UMLS) search engine. 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the data set of the patented genes before the 
Myriad case. As shown in Table 1, the panel data comprises 21,216 observations for 
3,536 genes over the years 2011–2016. In this data set, 3,142 genes are in the treatment 
group and are compared with 349 genes in the control group. For an average gene, 0.25 
new diagnostic tests are developed annually. Startup (established) firms, on average, 
develop 0.12 (0.05) new tests annually. From the total of 3,536 genes, 884 (2,652) genes 
are associated with central (peripheral markets), resulting in 5,304 (15,912) observations. 
In central (peripheral) markets, on average, 0.45 (0.18) new genetic tests are annually 
developed. Finally, cumulative DALYs per gene cover a wide range with a minimum of 0 
and maximum of 1822.44. 
 
Model Specification 
To estimate the new gene-based diagnostic test development rate, I specify the outcome 
variable as the number of annual new diagnostic tests developed by any diagnostic clinic 
in the U.S. for any given gene. The summary statistics presented in Table 1 shows that 
this variable violates the equidispersion assumption of Poisson distribution. In my 
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analyses, therefore, I use Poisson Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood Estimator that relaxes the 
equality assumption between mean and variance (Cameron & Trivedi, 2013). Further, in 
all my specifications I use Poisson Fixed Effects with robust standard errors that 
according to Wooldridge (1999) consistently estimates the parameter of interest. 
 In my first set of analyses, I employ a difference-in-differences estimator and 
study the gene-based diagnostic test development rates before and after the Myriad case. 
For simplicity, I assume that the Myriad case affects the genes whose cDNA is not 
claimed (treated=1) but not the genes whose cDNA is included in their patent claims 
(treated=0). Formally, I estimate the following model: 
𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔𝑛𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐_𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 = 𝑓(𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑀𝑦𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡) 
where 𝑡 indexes the year and 𝑖 indexes the gene. In this model, 𝛾𝑡 represents the year 
dummy variables that control for macro-level variations that affect all genes similarly and 
𝜃𝑖 is gene fixed-effects that capture the gene’s time-invariant characteristics, e.g., 
chromosomal location and associated diseases. 
Furthermore, I explore the heterogeneity of the impact across firms 
(entrepreneurial v. established) and markets (peripheral v. central). Since the level of 
analysis is a gene and the noted characteristics are observed at the firm- and market-
levels, I do not use interaction terms to explore heterogeneity. Instead, I separate my 
sample to generate new outcome variables for each attribute separately. First, I focus on 
the firm age, as a proxy for its entrepreneurial or incumbent status, and explore changes 
in the diagnostic test development in two different age categories: young (age≤5) and old 
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(age>5) (Agarwal, Ganco, & Ziedonis, 2009). Second, using the market centrality 
variable, I run the same regression model for central and peripheral markets, separately. 
 
The Myriad Case as a Quasi-Experimental Setting 
In 1980, addressing the Diamond v. Chakrabarty case, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that 
live organisms are patent-eligible. With the emergence of biotechnology as a profitable 
life science industry, this ruling marked the beginning of a long-lasting rush to isolate 
genes from their DNA environment and patent them. A group of scientists at the 
University of California, Berkeley, filed the first gene patent application and initiated the 
practice of gene patenting – a practice that reportedly led to the patenting of more than 20 
percent of the entire human genome by 2005 (Jensen & Murray, 2005). Myriad Genetics, 
a Utah-based company, was one of the firms that owned patent rights over BRCA1 and 
BRCA2 genes. Mutations of these genes could help predict the susceptibility of patients 
to breast and ovarian cancer. Using its gene patents, Myriad developed diagnostic tests 
for hereditary breast and ovarian cancer (i.e., BROCA tests) and was allegedly aggressive 
in enforcing its patent rights to protect and control rights to use and perform (Blanton, 
2002). 
 In response to Myriad’s patent enforcement, the American Civil Liberties Union 
(ACLU) started a campaign to invalidate Myriad’s patents, which after a few decisions 
and appeals, was petitioned to the U.S. Supreme Court with the question “are human 
genes patentable”. On June 13, 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court rendered verdict in the 
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Myriad case and as part of the decision, declared that isolated genes are parts of nature 
and therefore are ineligible for patent protection. 
Given the relatively long history of gene patents and in particular the controversy 
around Myriad’s patents, I should establish that the ruling over the Myriad case came at a 
surprise to the stakeholders. Otherwise, in case the outcome of the ruling was anticipated, 
the gene patent owners could change their activities and endogenously select into the 
groups with favorable outcomes. To investigate the selection concerns, I first present the 
qualitative evidence that confirms the difficulty of anticipating the Supreme Court’s 
decision on the case, after the hearing session. Reports published after the case hearing 
show that the Supreme Court justices seemed to be taking different positions on the issue 
of patent-eligibility of human genes. On May 14, 2013, Los Angeles Times reports: “[...] 
justices seemed split. Some wondered about the implications of allowing patents for 
items extracted from nature. Would that logic apply to a plant found in the Amazon 
jungle? Or to an entire chromosome extracted from a cell? Others feared that companies 
wouldn’t be willing to make the investment needed to isolate sequences if they couldn’t 
patent the results.”  CQ Researcher publishes a similar note about the division among 
justices on the day of hearing: “Justices grappled with the science and the law during the 
hour-long argument on April 15, but several seemed skeptical of allowing a patent for a 
gene naturally found in the human body even if scientists had to work to isolate it. Other 
justices, however, voiced concerns that researchers needed the prospect of patent 
protection to provide economic incentives for their work.”  Finally, Wall Street Journal 
reports that while Justice Sotomayor uses chocolate-chip cookies as an analogy to argue 
  
24 
that its natural elements like flour and eggs are not patentable “simply because I’ve 
created a new use or a new product from those ingredients”, Justice Kennedy highlights 
the concerns about invalidating patents and its implications: “I just don’t think we can 
decide the case on the ground, ‘Oh, don’t worry about investment’.” Such disagreements 
in the hearing session imply that it is unlikely that the stakeholders could perfectly 
anticipate the decision prior to its announcement. 
The quantitative evidence further suggests that the ruling was unexpected and 
consequential to the companies that owned gene patents. Figure 1 shows the value of 
Myriad Genetics shares between June 11, 2013, two business days before the 
announcement and June 19, 2013, four business days after the announcement. The graph 
displays a significant drop in the share value of Myriad, relative to the NASDAQ index. 
In only three business days, from June 13 to June 17, Myriad lost $114.37 million in 
market value. I interpret this drop as evidence of a noticeable shift in investors’ 
expectations of Myriad’s future cash flows. 
 
<Insert Figure 1 here> 
 
Further, I ran an event study to examine the impact of the Myriad case on the 
value of publicly-traded gene patent owner organizations. My intention is to test whether 
the Myriad case has affected the average gene patent owner organization and to ensure its 
impact is not limited to Myriad alone. To run the event study, I use the Eventus service 
from Wharton Research Data Services. The test includes 622 publicly-traded patent 
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owner companies, as listed in Appendix B, and plots the changes in their average share 
value over the period of two days before and after the Myriad case, as shown in Figure 2. 
Figure 2 illustrates the average share value of the selected sample of public companies, 
along with the 95 percent confidence intervals around them. As presented in Figure 2, the 
average value of these companies’ shares experiences a noticeable decrease following the 
announcement of the Supreme Court’s decision on the Myriad case. I interpret this as 
evidence of the Myriad case’s general impact on the average gene patent owner firms and 
not Myriad alone. 
 
<Insert Figure 2 here> 
 
Taken together, both qualitative and quantitative evidence suggests that the gene 
patent owner organizations could not perfectly predict the Supreme Court’s verdict in the 
Myriad case, hinting toward its appropriateness to be used as a quasi-experiment setting. 
 
 
RESULTS 
Results are presented in Tables 2–5. First, I show the results of the impact of the 
Myriad case on the development of new diagnostic tests in Table 2. Next, I present the 
differential impacts on entrepreneurial and established firms in Table 3 and on central 
and peripheral markets in Table 4. Table 5 presents the results for different combinations 
of these subsamples. 
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Consistent with my theoretical predictions, the strong positive estimates suggest 
that the development rate of new diagnostic tests significantly increases for the treatment 
group after the Myriad ruling invalidated gene patents. Column 1 in Table 2 presents the 
results of the Poisson regression without including the year dummies and gene fixed-
effects. The estimate is negative and significant, contrasting with the theoretical 
predictions. Column 2 adds the gene fixed effects. In this model, the magnitude of the 
coefficient is modestly decreased but is still negative and strong. Finally, Column 3 
includes the year dummies and gene fixed-effects and presents the difference-in-
differences estimator. This estimate is positive and strong, which I interpret as evidence 
of an increase in innovation rates in the diagnostic sector following the withdrawal of 
patents on genomic compounds. For this estimate, the incidence rate ratio is presented in 
brackets. According to this figure, the withdrawal of patents from isolated genes has 
increased the development of new gene-based diagnostic tests by 41 percent per year, on 
average. 
 
<Insert Table 2 here> 
 
I also explore the dynamics of this effect in Figure 3. The figure plots the 
estimates of interacting the difference-in-differences estimator with dummy variables for 
each year, along with the 95 percent confidence interval around them. The trends show 
that prior to the Myriad case, the estimates are not strongly different from zero. However, 
following the Myriad case, the effect becomes evident in the upward slope of the 
  
27 
estimates, showing that the treated genes experience larger rates of new diagnostic test 
development. According to Liotta and Petricoin (2012), the FDA regulatory approval 
process for the molecular diagnostic testing includes classification of the diagnostic test, 
running premarket approval tests, and comparing the diagnostic test with Clinical 
Laboratory Improvement Amendments (CLIA) and on average, takes almost two years to 
complete. This is consistent with the trend becoming significant more than two years 
after the Myriad case. 
 
<Insert Figure 3 here> 
 
Now turning attention to the heterogenous impacts the Myriad case may have on 
different types of firms and markets, I present the results of the heterogeneity analyses in 
Tables 3–5. Table 3 shows the estimates of running the Poisson regression over two 
different samples, separated by the age of the diagnostic test provider firm. As presented 
in Table 3, the estimates are not significant in Column 2, suggesting that the Myriad case 
had an indiscernible effect on the development of new diagnostic tests in established 
companies. In contrast, for young entrepreneurial companies, the estimate in Column 1 is 
positive and strong. In the sample of entrepreneurial firms, the invalidation of gene 
patents has raised the development of new diagnostic tests by 38 percent per year, on 
average. My interpretation of these estimates is that entrepreneurial firms are the main 
drivers of new diagnostic test developments after the invalidation of gene patents, which 
is consistent with the prior studies that highlight that patents disproportionately impact 
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the entrepreneurial firms vis-à-vis their established counterparts. 
 
<Insert Table 3 here> 
 
Table 4 presents the results of a similar analysis, but this time for samples 
separated by whether the genes are associated with central or peripheral markets. As 
shown in Table 4, the difference-in-differences estimator for central markets is positive 
and strong, whereas the same estimator for peripheral markets is weak and insignificant. I 
interpret this dissimilarity as evidence of the higher barriers to entry into central markets 
erected by gene patents. Following the invalidation of these patents, the central markets 
may allow for more entry that could lead to higher rates of innovation in diagnostic 
testing in these markets. On the other hand, in the peripheral markets, although genes 
similarly lost the prior patent protection, there is not as much incentive for diagnostic 
firms to enter and invest in new diagnostic test development in these markets. 
 
<Insert Table 4 here> 
 
Finally, Table 5 presents the results of the analyses on the combination of the 
noted subsamples. Columns 1–3 show the estimates of new diagnostic tests developed by 
diagnostic firms at different ages, separated by the centrality of the markets. Similar to 
the previous tables, Table 6 shows the difference-in-differences estimator of the Poisson 
regression. While the coefficients for established firms in both central and peripheral 
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markets are weak and insignificant, the estimates of the entrepreneurial firms are 
interesting. Not surprisingly, the estimate of the new diagnostic tests developed by 
startups in central markets is positive and strongly significant. Consistent with the results 
discussed earlier, following the Myriad case, entrepreneurial firms are more active in 
developing new diagnostic tests in central markets.  
 
<Insert Table 5 here> 
 
 
ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
A primary concern with analyzing outcome variables at the gene level is the 
inherent heterogeneity among genes. Genes are not similar in their therapeutic value. 
TP53, for instance, translates into tumor-suppressor protein p53 which is mutated in up to 
half of all cancers, making it a highly important gene in biological discoveries. In 
contrast, on the other tail of the spectrum, there are numerous genes with no specific 
associated diseases. Fortunately, many of the heterogeneous genomic characteristics, 
such as chromosomal locations and the mapping dates, are time-invariant, allowing me to 
control for them using gene fixed effects. But a prominent relevant time-variant variable 
is the size of the knowledge repository accumulated for each gene. Gene-related scientific 
discoveries can contribute significantly to the development of innovative methods of 
diagnostic testing and an empirical concern is whether the earlier results are indeed 
driven by the withdrawal of gene patents or are they merely the outcome of gene-related 
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scientific progress. To address this issue, I run the initial difference-in-differences 
regression, but this time I assign the log of the cumulative number of scientific 
publications associated with each gene as weights. I collect the publication data from 
Kerpedjiev’s (2017) study, published in Nature, which presents a ranking of genes based 
on the number of their associated scientific publications. The results of this analysis are 
presented in Table 6. The difference-in-differences estimate is statistically strong and 
comparable to the previous estimates in magnitude. I find the publication-weighted genes 
that lose patent protection to have a 61 percent higher chance of innovative diagnostic 
test development. 
 
<Insert Table 6> 
 
To test the robustness of the other results, I check for the sensitivity of the 
findings with regards to entrepreneurship to the definitions of the “entrepreneurial firm”.  
Therefore, I repeat the analyses for different cutoff points for separating the startups from 
the established firms. In this set of analyses, the firm is considered entrepreneurial if its 
age at the time of the Myriad case ruling is 4 and 7, respectively. The prior results are 
robust to these cutoff points. The results of these robustness checks are shown in Table 7. 
 
<Insert Table 7 here> 
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 With regards to the demand for diagnostic tests, I employ an independent gene 
ranking list (Kerpedjiev, 2017).  This list presents the ranking of the most studied genes. 
On top of this list we see TNF (tumor necrosis factor which has been a drug target for 
cancers and inflammatory diseases), and EGFR (epidermal growth factor receptor is a 
membrane-bound protein which is often mutated in drug-resistant cancers). The list ranks 
the entire set of more than 20,000 discovered protein-coding human genes which I use as 
an independent measure of the criticality of diagnosing a specific gene mutation. The 
results of the interaction between the treated variable with this ranking are presented in 
Table 8 and are consistent with the prior findings that following the withdrawal of patents 
on genes, most innovative activities are shifted toward more critical genes. 
 
<Insert Table 8 here> 
 
Finally, I turn my attention to genetic diseases and take a different approach in 
viewing the importance of markets. Previously, I measured market centrality based on the 
potential market size per gene. However, from a health policy perspective, the market 
size is not always the top criterion for measuring the disease’s importance. Huntington 
Disease, for example, is a rare genetic disorder that affects the nervous system and, 
according to the Portal for Rare Diseases and Orphan Drugs, its prevalence in the 
Caucasian population is estimated at only one in every 20,000–100,000 people. Although 
there is no proved treatment for changing the course of Huntington's Disease yet, early 
genetic diagnosis can be significantly useful in lessening the symptoms and help the 
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patients adapt to their gradual changes. To take these important genetic tests that market 
size may overlook into account, I introduce another measure of market importance based 
on the morbidity rates of genetic disorders. To construct this variable, I select the genes 
associated with genetic diseases with the highest morbidity rates, as reported by the 
WHO. The list of these diseases includes Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome 
(AIDS), Thalassaemia, Sickle cell anemia, Asthma, Cardiovascular disease, Haemophilia, 
Cystic Fibrosis, Diabetes, Down Syndrome, Fragile X syndrome, Huntington’s disease, 
Tuberculosis, Malaria, and Tay Sachs disease. I run the difference-in-differences model 
for the “critical” genes, associated with these diseases, and the rest of “non-critical” 
genes, separately. Table 8 presents the results. Similar to the central and peripheral 
markets analysis, the estimates show that following the patent withdrawal from human 
genes, innovation for critical genes, associated with high morbidity rates, has increased 
noticeably whereas non-critical genes have not experienced a significant change in 
downstream innovation.  
 
<Insert Table 9 here> 
 
 
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
Like any study, my analysis is limited in scope. First, this study examines the 
invalidation of a specific type of IP rights on gene patents. While this setting allows for 
carefully identifying a large population of these patents in a standard, replicable, and 
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straight-forward manner, some specific features are unique to gene patents and one 
should be cautious about generalizing the findings. One main feature of the gene patents 
is that they are generally broad in scope and it is more difficult to invent around them. 
Genetic compounds, such as sequences and recombinant proteins, are so basic that in 
most cases, creating a replicate or a substitute for them is extremely costly and difficult, 
if not entirely impossible (Merz & Cho, 2005). This feature is dissimilar to the other 
types of patents, in which case, inventing around is usually considered a doable and 
recommended approach to continue the competition with patent owners (Graham et al., 
2009).  
Furthermore, this paper studies the gene-based diagnostic sector which is among 
the few industries where patents are considered as a key tool to protect innovations 
(Levin et al., 1987; Cohen et al., 2000; Graham et al., 2009). In other fields, like 
software, for example, patents are used to gain reputation in the industry more than they 
are employed as a method of protecting innovation. One related avenue for future 
research is to explore these other uses of patents and study how patents could impact 
innovation in the settings where they are not key tools for protecting innovation. Several 
high-profile legal cases have recently affected patents in different industries which could 
be exploited as natural experiments, similar to the approach this study takes, to deepen 
our understanding of the roles patents play in different settings. As an example, the 2014 
U.S. Supreme Court ruling on Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International (the Alice case, for 
brevity) could be illuminating. In June 2014, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the Alice 
case and unanimously ruled that abstract ideas are not patent-eligible subject matters, 
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even if implemented into computer software. This ruling has challenged the patentability 
of software products and methods and its impact on the industry has yet to be studied. 
This setting is particularly useful due to the dissimilar roles that patents play in the 
software industry, compared to the other industries.  
Another potential avenue is to examine the substitution effects of the different IP 
forms. Multiple case studies show when formal IP systems, such as patents, are 
weakened, firms become more interested in keeping their innovations as trade secrets. 
Conley, Cook-Deegan, and Lazaro-Munoz (2014), for instance, show that Myriad 
Genetics, after losing its BRCA1/2 gene patent claims, became more interested in 
expanding its database of genetic mutations and the associated health outcomes and 
keeping it from the access of their competitors as a trade secret. Underlying the patent 
system is the idea of disclosure and sharing the knowledge in exchange for a limited-term 
monopoly over the commercialization of the innovation. Switching to trade secrets as a 
way to keep the intellectual property, therefore, can have fundamental implications for 
innovation. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
This paper provides new evidence on the impact of upstream patents on 
downstream commercialized innovations. Exploiting a sudden shift in the patentability of 
genes and compiling data on the population of active patents over isolated genes, I 
challenge the prior empirical literature that reported the indiscernible impact of gene 
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patents on follow-on diagnostic testing. My findings show that the invalidation of patents 
over genomic compounds after the Myriad case has in fact increased innovative activities 
in the development of new genetic testing innovations. This paper also shows that after 
the withdrawal of upstream patents, primarily the entrepreneurial firms drive the 
cumulative innovation process. The startups that are often pushed toward peripheral 
markets due to the patents in the upstream of the value chain benefit from the withdrawal 
of patents more than their established counterparts and re-allocate their resources so they 
can enter the central markets. 
Before the Supreme Court’s ruling on the Myriad case was announced, the 
scientific community seemed divided around the gravity of consequences that a potential 
sweeping invalidation of gene patents may bring about. While on one extreme, some 
feared that the withdrawal of patent protection from genes might be the first step toward 
the ultimate death of the biotechnology industry (Blanton, 2010), others predicted a less 
drastic impact or, on the other extreme, no impact whatsoever on biopharmaceutical and 
diagnostic industries (Graff et al., 2013). The former group reminded the readers that the 
gene patents had played a critical role in the emergence and success of biotechnology 
startups like Amgen and the latter group argued that the gene patents were far from their 
heyday and with their expiration dates approaching, they were destined to become 
obsolete sooner or later. Thus, their invalidation would, at most, merely facilitate their 
obsolescence. Surprisingly, no consensus emerged even after the Supreme Court 
announced its decision on the case. If anything, the divide among these speculations 
seemed to have grown wider. This paper is the first study to systematically investigate the 
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innovative outcomes of this high-profile ruling and document evidence of the impact it 
has had on the gene-based diagnostic sector. 
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Figure 1. Myriad Genetics Stock Price Before and After the Ruling's Announcement  
(Source: Yahoo Finance) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Myriad’s ruling announced Weekend 
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Figure 2. Cumulative Abnormal Returns for 62 Public Gene-Patent Owner Companies  
(-1,+2) Days Around the Event  (Source: Wharton Research Data Services) 
* Company names are presented in Appendix B 
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Figure 3. Diagnostic Test Development Before and After the Ruling 
  
Average time required 
for FDA approval 
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VARIABLE Observation Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Min. 
Max. 
Sample includes 3,536 patented genes, 2011–2016 
Genes 21,216 -- -- -- 
-- 
Treated 21,216 0.89 0.31 0 
1 
Annual new diagnostic tests 
per gene 
21,216 0.25 0.73 0 16 
Annual gene-related 
Publications per gene 
21,144 132.26 326.96 0 8,484 
Annual new diagnostic tests 
per gene developed by 
entrepreneurial firms 
21,216 0.12 0.33 0 2 
Annual new diagnostic tests 
per gene developed by 
established firms 
21,216 0.05 0.33 0 8 
Annual new diagnostic tests 
per gene developed in central 
markets 
5,304 0.45 1.14 0 16 
Annual new diagnostic tests 
per gene developed in 
peripheral markets 
15,912 0.18 0.51 0 9 
Cumulative Disability-
Adjusted Life Years (DALYs) 
per gene in logs 
21,216 55.70 127.02 0 1822.438 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
  
  
41 
VARIABLES 
(1) 
Poisson 
 
New_Diagnostic_Tests 
(2) 
Poisson 
 
New_Diagnostic_Tests 
(3) 
Poisson 
 
New_Diagnostic_Tests 
Treated 
-0.37*** 
(0.040) 
-0.38*** 
(0.045) 
0.35*** 
[1.41] 
(0.131) 
Gene Fixed-
Effects 
No Yes Yes 
Year Dummies No No Yes 
Observations 17,680 14,755 14,755 
Number of genes 3,536 2,951 2,951 
Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
• Standard errors are clustered at the gene level 
Table 2. New Diagnostic Tests after the Invalidation of Patented Genes 
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VARIABLES 
(1) 
Poisson 
 
New_Diagnostic_Tests 
(2) 
Poisson 
 
New_Diagnostic_Tests 
  
 
Firm Age Young Old 
Treated 
0.32** 
(0.154) 
0.12 
(0.257) 
Gene Fixed-Effects Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes 
Observations 12,450 2,915 
Number of genes 2,490 583 
Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
• Standard errors are clustered at the gene level 
Firm age categories are defined as: 
• Young: Established in 2008 or afterward 
• Old: Established before 2008 
Table 3. New Diagnostic Tests by Firm Age 
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VARIABLES 
(1) 
Poisson 
 
New_Diagnostic_Tests 
(2) 
Poisson 
 
New_Diagnostic_Tests 
Market Centrality Central Peripheral 
Treated 
0.37** 
(0.181) 
0.14 
(0.211) 
Gene Fixed-Effects Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes 
Observations 4,135 10,620 
Number of genes 827 2,124 
Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
• Standard errors are clustered at the gene level 
• Central markets are associated with high Disability-Adjusted Life Years (DALYs), Top 
25% 
• Peripheral markets are associated with low Disability-Adjusted Life Years (DALYs), 
Bottom 75% 
Table 4. New Diagnostic Tests by Market Centrality 
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VARIABLES 
(1) 
Poisson 
 
New_Diagnostic_Tests 
(2) 
Poisson 
 
New_Diagnostic_Tests 
Firm Age Young Old 
Market 
Centrality 
Central Peripheral Central Peripheral 
Treated 
0.75*** 
(0.260) 
-0.04 
(0.234) 
0.02 
(0.320) 
0.26 
(0.435) 
Gene Fixed-
Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,825 9,625 1,745 1,170 
Number of 
genes 
565 1,925 349 234 
Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
• Standard errors are clustered at the gene level 
Table 5. New Diagnostic Tests by Firm Age and Market Centrality 
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VARIABLES 
(1) 
Poisson 
 
New_Diagnostic_Tests 
Treated 
0.36*** 
(0.026) 
Gene Fixed-Effects 
Yes 
Year Dummies 
Yes 
Observations 
14,755 
Number of genes 
2,951 
Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
• Standard errors are clustered at the gene level 
 
 
Table 6. New Diagnostic Tests after the Invalidation of Patented Genes, Weighted by Gene-
related Scientific Publications (Robustness Checks) 
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(1) 
Poisson 
 
(2) 
Poisson 
 
VARIABLES Diagnostic_Tests 
(Firm Age≤3) 
Diagnostic_Tests 
(Firm Age≤10) 
   
Treated * Firm_Age 0.41** 0.31** 
 (0.162) 
 
(0.154) 
 
Gene fixed-effects 
 
Yes Yes 
Time dummies Yes 
 
Yes 
Observations 11,945 12,435 
Number of genes 2,389 2,478 
Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
• Standard errors are clustered at the gene level 
 
Table 7. New Diagnostic Tests by Firm Age (Robustness Check) 
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(1) 
Poisson 
 
VARIABLES Diagnostic_Tests 
  
Treated * Gene_Ranking 0.432*** 
 (0.120) 
 
 
Gene fixed-effects 
 
Yes 
Time dummies Yes 
 
Observations 6,270 
Number of genes 1,254 
Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
• Standard errors are clustered at the gene level 
 
Table 8. New Diagnostic Tests by Gene Ranking (Robustness Check) 
  
  
48 
VARIABLES 
(1) 
Poisson 
 
New_Diagnostic_Tests 
(2) 
Poisson 
 
New_Diagnostic_Tests 
Gene Criticality Critical Non-Critical 
Treated 
0.34** 
(0.156) 
-0.06 
(0.243) 
Gene Fixed-Effects Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes 
Observations 6,755 8,000 
Number of genes 1,351 1,600 
Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
• Standard errors are clustered at the gene level 
• Critical genes are those that are associated with the top-10 diseases with the highest 
mortality rates: Cystic Fibrosis, Tay-Sachs, Alcoholism, Breast and Colon Cancer, Sickle 
Cell Disease, Obesity, Heart Disease, Hemophilia, Huntington’s Disease, and 
Hemochromatosis 
 
 
Table 9. New Diagnostic Tests by Gene Criticality (Robustness Check)
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PROPRIETARY RIGHTS AND THE MARKET FOR TECHNOLOGY: 
EVIDENCE FROM THE INVALIDATED GENE PATENTS 
INTRODUCTION 
The market for technology plays a critical role in innovation and economic 
growth. The prior foundational body of work on this market has established its 
importance in enabling innovative firms to commercialize their innovations through 
cooperative arrangements with established firms and generate revenues through licensing 
their technologies (Arora, Fosfuri, Gambardella, 2001; Gans & Stern, 2003). Markets for 
technology are reportedly large and expanding. Robbins (2006) and Arora and 
Gambardella (2010) estimate that the U.S. income from technology licensing was 
approximately $50 billion in 2002, which shows considerable growth since the mid-
1990s when this income was estimated at about $25–35 billion (Arora, Fosfuri, & 
Gambardella, 2001). 
Theoretical works on the markets for technologies and ideas underline the 
importance of strong IP rights regime for these markets to function (Teece, 1986; Arora, 
Fosfuri, & Gambardella, 2001; Gans & Stern, 2003). Strong IP rights, particularly 
patents, allow innovative firms to protect their inventions against expropriation hazards. 
They address the information asymmetry problems, such as the paradox of disclosure 
(Arrow, 1962) and moral hazard (Arora, 1986), that may arise during licensing 
negotiations, and thus increase the likelihood of reaching licensing agreements. Although 
the importance of IP rights for technology markets is theoretically established, the 
  
50 
empirical evidence to support it is limited. In particular, we have little evidence at the 
firm level to confirm the impact of patent rights on technology licensing activities.   
In this study, I address this gap by exploiting an unexpected shift in the 
patentability of genomic compounds and estimating its impact on the firm-level 
technology licensing activities. In June 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court rendered verdict in 
the Myriad case. As part of the decision, the Court unexpectedly declared that isolated 
genes are parts of nature and therefore are ineligible for patent protection. According to 
the American Medical Association, the ruling invalidated proprietary rights to over 6,000 
genes in humans alone. My empirical strategy in this paper is to identify organizations 
that owned such gene patents at the time of the ruling and examine the impact of this 
patent loss on their technology licensing deals. To mitigate the endogeneity concerns, I 
match these organizations with a group of similar organizations with no gene patents and 
employ a difference-in-difference framework to estimate this impact. Further, I use 
insights from the market design literature (Roth, 2007, 2008; Gans & Stern, 2010) to 
explore the heterogeneity of treatment effects across different markets. 
Consistent with the theoretical arguments, I find evidence of a strong impact of 
patents on technology licensing. Following the invalidation of gene patents, the 
technology licensing rates of gene patent owner organizations decreases significantly 
relative to similar organizations with no gene patents. The impact is persistent during the 
four years after the Myriad case and is more salient for the organizations with larger 
shares of gene patents. Moreover, the impact is stronger across the gene-related 
therapeutic markets, although not always statistically significant.  
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This study contributes novel empirical evidence to the literature on technology 
markets. To my knowledge, this is the first large-scale empirical study to provide 
evidence on the causal impact of patents on technology licensing rates at the organization 
level. My empirical approach consists of a sudden and surprising exogenous shock, 
careful consideration of a relevant control group, and novel detailed data on technology 
licensing deals – an outcome variable often characterized by data scarcity. My findings 
suggest a strong connection between a firm’s patent portfolio and its ability to engage in 
technology markets to license its technologies. I observe this connection in various 
relevant therapeutic markets. 
 In addition, my findings speak to a set of recent high-profile policy shifts in 
patent-eligibility of a variety of subject matters. As reported by Caulfield et al. (2013), in 
several cases,   the needed empirical evidence is lacking and the policy is informed by 
speculations and anecdotes. Five years after the Myriad case, I shed light on one of its 
impacts on the life sciences industries. Through a careful analysis of cooperative 
agreements among biopharmaceutical firms, this study reports a decrease in the 
technology licensing rates, after the invalidation of gene patents. This paper joins the few 
other works that explore the impact of the Myriad case on different aspects of business 
and innovation in biopharmaceuticals (Aboy et al., 2016). 
 The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the theoretical and empirical 
literature on Markets for Technologies and Ideas. Section 3 presents the setting, data, and 
empirical methodology. Section 4 reports the results, while Section 5 discusses their 
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robustness. In Section 6, I describe limitations of the study and potential avenues for 
future research. Section 7 concludes. 
 
 
THEORY 
Patents and the Technology Markets 
 Markets for technology facilitate revenue generation through technology licensing 
for innovative firms. A well-functioning technology market enlarges the strategy space 
for innovators: instead of, or along with, making investments in commercializing 
innovations and entering the markets for products, firms can license out their 
technologies and leave the commercialization part to the incumbents that own the 
necessary commercialization resources. The efficiency created by technology trades 
allows firms to focus either on innovation or commercialization. This ideally creates an 
industry-wide division of labor where R&D specialists generate innovations and 
incumbents commercialize them. Pisano (1991) and Hall and Ziedonis (2001) document 
evidence of such vertical disintegrations in the biopharmaceutical and semiconductor 
sectors, respectively. 
 The Market for Technology literature contends that whether firms choose a 
cooperative commercialization strategy and sell/buy technologies or vertically integrate 
the R&D and enter the product markets depends on three main factors: the strength of IP 
rights regime, the negotiation costs between inventors and incumbents, and the 
importance and accessibility of the complementary assets required for commercialization 
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(Teece, 1986; Gans & Stern, 2003). Cooperative commercialization is a more viable 
option when complementary assets are essential and difficult to access, bargaining costs 
between inventors and incumbents are low, and a strong IP rights regime is in place 
(Gans et al., 2002). 
 The mechanisms through which each factor affects technology markets are 
theoretically well-established. Firstly, the role of IP rights in facilitating cooperative 
commercialization can be explained by the notion of the paradox of disclosure (Arrow, 
1962; Anton & Yao, 1994). Simply stated, the more a potential buyer knows about the 
idea, the more her willingness-to-pay is. However, more disclosure of the idea can raise 
the risk of expropriation. Strong IP rights regimes help innovators safeguard their ideas, 
mitigate the frictions introduced by expropriation hazards, and motivate firms to engage 
in cooperative arrangements more actively. Moreover, by owning IP rights on innovation, 
the technology licensor can disclose her technology to several potential licensees, play 
them against each other, license the technology to the highest bidder, and earn higher 
profits from technology licensing (Gans & Stern, 2003). Such a setting can also motivate 
the established firms to license in technologies. When patent rights are enforced, 
licensors often negotiate under the “shadow of competition”, i.e., one of their bargaining 
chips is to threat market entry as a competitor (Gans, Hsu, & Stern, 2002). Deciding 
between having a collaborator or a competitor, the established firms have more incentives 
to reach a cooperative agreement.   
 Secondly, the complementary assets that are costly to build, such as regulatory 
expertise and brand recognition, can increase the relative likelihood of cooperation as 
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well. Instead of sinking sizable costs to replicate the needed complementary assets, it 
could be much less costly for an innovator to license out her technology and leave the 
commercialization with the incumbent owner of complementary assets. Finally, 
bargaining costs can shape a firm’s decision to cooperate or compete. When bargaining 
costs are low, for instance in the cases where there exist reliable intermediaries to match 
buyers and sellers and evaluate the technology, forging agreements is easier, which 
increases the likelihood of cooperative commercialization via markets for technology. 
 Empirical studies suggest that opposing conditions can create frictions in the 
technology markets. Based on a survey of venture-backed and SBIR-backed startups, 
Gans, Hsu, and Stern (2002) provide evidence of more cooperation when the three 
conditions, i.e., strong IP rights regime, difficult to build complementary assets, and low 
bargaining cost, are satisfied. In their following work, Gans, Hsu, and Stern (2008) 
examine the timing of cooperation and demonstrate that the licensing occurs earlier when 
the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) alleviates the uncertainty around 
patenting of innovations. Their study sheds light on a new aspect of patents’ role in 
cooperative commercialization: accelerating the licensing process. Chatterji and Fabrizio 
(2016) take a different approach and investigate the role of bargaining costs in 
technology markets. They document evidence of a sudden increase in the negotiation 
costs between innovators and incumbents in the orthopedic sector of medical devices, 
leading to a decrease in the cooperative commercialization of innovation in this sector. 
Although the theoretical arguments of the Market for Technology (Arora, Fosfuri, & 
Gambardella, 2001) and Idea (Gans & Stern, 2003) literature mainly revolve around firm-
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level strategies to cooperate in the technology markets or compete in the product markets, 
the empirical studies have been primarily focused on the decision to produce or license, 
at the innovation level (Chatterji & Fabrizio’s (2016) study is a notable exception). 
Specifically, the extant literature provides little evidence on how owning IP rights, most 
notably patents, shape a firm’s strategy to commercialize cooperatively, in the form of 
technology licensing, or to enter the competition, in the form of product market entry. 
 Building on the prior works, therefore, the present study aims to address this gap. 
In the context of the sudden invalidation of gene patents, I predict the technology 
licensing activities of the firms with larger shares of invalidated gene patents in their 
portfolios to decrease. Following the partial invalidation of their patent portfolios, these 
firms not only lose some of their bargaining chips, but face a higher risk of being 
expropriated. In a similar vein, established firms also have less incentive to forge 
licensing deals with the owners of invalidated patents. In the words of a licensing director 
for a large pharmaceutical company, “Patents are critical for start-up firms. Without 
patents, we won’t even talk to a start-up about licensing” (Walsh, Arora, & Cohen, 2003). 
I, therefore, expect to observe a decrease in the licensing rates of firms with a large gene 
patent share at the time of the Myriad case. 
 
Structural Market Characteristics and the Technology Markets 
A related body of scholarship on Markets for Technology underlines the market 
characteristics that may influence the commercialization modes that innovative firms 
choose. Pisano (1990), for instance, posits that the small number of R&D specialists in a 
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therapeutic market decreases the alternative choices for pharmaceutical firms and 
encourages them to internalize R&D, instead of licensing technologies from 
biotechnology firms. Thus, a smaller market size, he argues, could be associated with 
lower technological licensing rates. Including competition in his model, Fosfuri (2006) 
asserts that the relationship between market size and technology licensing rates is 
inverted-U shaped. The presence of multiple competitive technology suppliers sets an 
upper limit to the positive correlation between market size and licensing that Pisano 
(1990) suggested. Therefore, a large market size diminishes the revenues generated by 
licensing technologies and makes cooperative commercialization less appealing.    
 Building on insights from the market design literature (Roth, 2007, and 2008) and 
using the Licensing Executives Society’s (LES) survey data, Agrawal, Cockburn, and 
Zhang (2015) examine three structural market characteristics and their impact on 
technology licensing. They demonstrate that market thickness, non-congestion, and safety 
can each influence technology licensing, in different stages. First, market thickness, i.e., 
the number of potential buyers and sellers of technology, can increase the likelihood of 
finding partners for licensing and cooperative commercialization of innovation. Second, 
bargaining frictions, e.g., the costs of due diligence of technology, can decrease the 
likelihood of firms’ engagement in licensing activities.  Finally, market safety, i.e., the 
extent to which firms avoid misrepresenting their technologies or expropriate 
innovations, can decrease disclosure concerns and, thus, increase the likelihood of 
licensing. 
 While analyzing the direct impact of such market characteristics on licensing rates 
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is not within the purview of this study, I use insights from the market design literature to 
explore the heterogeneity across different markets and examine the differential impacts 
that owning patents in each market has on licensing rates. In particular, I investigate the 
interaction between the market thickness (from market design literature) and patent rights 
(from Market for Technology literature) in search for a combinatory understanding of the 
factors that shape the functioning of technology markets.  
 Agrawal, Cockburn, and Zhang (2015) demonstrate that market safety only 
influences licensing success in the final stage of licensing – reaching an agreement. In 
this stage, the licensor has to reveal detailed information about the technology and the 
paradox of disclosure becomes salient. In the absence of strong IP rights, the parties may 
act strategically in disclosing information. On the one side, concerned about 
expropriation, the seller may hide crucial information, and on the other side, the buyer 
may have an incentive to expropriate the technology, both increasing the likelihood of 
licensing failure. When the market is thick, the licensee has better chances of finding an 
alternative supplier. For the licensor, however, a larger number of established firms could 
increase the risk of being expropriated. Therefore, in the case of weak appropriability, I 
expect the licensing deals to fail more frequently in thick markets relative to those in thin 
markets. In thin markets, where alternative technology suppliers are sparse, established 
firms have an incentive to build a reputation for “fairness” and aim for long-term gains 
from external acquisition of innovation by creating an environment of mutual trust (Gans 
& Stern, 2003). Overall, thus, I expect losing patents to affect the technology licensing 
activities of innovative firms in thicker markets more severely than that of innovator 
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organizations in thinner markets. 
 Before describing the data and empirical methodology, I present a review of the 
evidence on licensing activities in the biopharmaceutical sector, especially in gene 
patents. 
 
The Market for Technology in the Biopharmaceuticals 
The Market for Technology scholars often consider the biopharmaceutical sector as an 
exemplary sector with a well-functioning market for technology. All the three criteria for 
a functioning technology market seem to be met in this sector. First, pharmaceutical 
firms, as the downstream commercializing companies, are highly dependent on patents 
for protecting their innovations. In Mansfield’s (1986) survey of 100 randomly selected 
manufacturing firms, the pharmaceutical and chemical industries give the highest value to 
patents for protecting their inventions, viewing them responsible for 30 percent of 
innovative developments. Levin et al. (1987) echo these findings. In their survey, “drugs” 
is the only sector, among eighteen sectors, where firms deem product patents as the most 
effective method of appropriating innovations. The same observation is reported in other 
surveys, including Cohen et al. (2000) and Graham et al. (2009). 
 Second, the complementary assets needed to commercialize biopharmaceutical 
innovations are extremely costly and difficult to replicate. In this sector, in order to enter 
the market, new products are required to go through multiple stages of testing and clinical 
trials at the U.S. Food & Drug Association (FDA). Martin et al. (2017) report that the 
median costs of the FDA clinical trials for therapeutic drugs are as follows: $3.4 million 
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for Phase I study involving patients, $8.6 million for Phase II study, and $21.4 million for 
Phase III study. Considering the uncertainty around the success of new drugs, such 
enormous sunk costs can be far beyond the amount that smaller firms can spend on 
commercializing their innovations. In addition, having access to marketing channels 
could be challenging for non-established companies.  
 Finally, bargaining cost in biopharmaceuticals appears to be lower, on average, 
relative to other sectors. A key component of negotiation costs among potential 
technology buyers and sellers is the valuation of the innovation. In the 
biopharmaceuticals, innovations are often in the form of molecules and genetic 
compounds, with a well-defined chemical structure. This mitigates the opportunities for 
strategic actions and makes it much easier to evaluate the value of innovation. Moreover, 
search and transaction costs for identifying and forging agreements could be lowered in 
the presence of intermediary institutions, such as venture capitalists (Gans, Hsu, & Stern, 
2002). According to the last Statista’s report on venture capital investments, only in the 
third quarter of 2018, venture capital investments in the Healthcare sector were more than 
$5 billion, ranking 2nd after the Internet sector and above industries, like Mobile and 
Communication, Food and Beverages, and Software. The substantial VC investment in 
the biopharmaceuticals displays a large number of brokers in the industry that could help 
technology buyers and sellers identify each other and therefore increase the likelihood of 
technology licensing. 
 It is not surprising, then, to observe a remarkable growth in technology licensing 
in biopharmaceuticals. As shown in Figure 4, BioWorld Financial Watch reports a ~650 
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percent growth in partnership deals in the life sciences industry from 1993 to 2005.  
 
<Insert Figure 4 here> 
 
Licensing Gene Patents 
Among biomedical patents, gene patents have been a particularly significant source of 
generating licensing revenue. According to the survey conducted by Pressman et al. 
(2006), universities alone licensed out 1,832 gene patents, among which 45 patents were 
licensed 10 times or more, while 775 gene patents were never licensed. From the licensed 
gene patents, 49 percent were nonexclusive licenses, whereas 26 percent were exclusive 
by field of use and 8 percent were exclusive in all fields of use. 
 For-profit firms also actively licensed their gene patents. Amgen’s licensing its 
patent over erythropoietin (EPO) to Johnson & Johnson is one example. Erythropoietin 
gene is produced in the kidney and expresses proteins that help increase the red blood 
cells. By successfully isolating this gene from the DNA and patenting it, Amgen 
managed to secure profits both from producing the genetically engineered drug, Epogen, 
used to treat anemia and from licensing it for other uses to Johnson & Johnson. One study 
estimated that by 1997, this patent was generating more than $1 billion annually for 
Amgen (Marshall, 1997). In their survey of top DNA patent owner organizations, Henry 
et al. (2003) report that for-profit companies, on average, licensed out 42 percent of their 
gene patent portfolios. This figure is comparable to the licensing rates of the non-profit 
gene patent owners that licensed out 51 percent of their gene patents, on average.  
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 Taken together, I interpret this evidence as confirming that the gene patents in the 
biopharmaceutical sector provide an appropriate setting to empirically test the role of 
patents in technology markets. 
 
 
DATA AND METHODS 
 In this study, my goal is to investigate the direction and magnitude of the impact 
that losing patent rights has on firm’s technology licensing activities. To do so, I exploit 
the Myriad case that suddenly and surprisingly, as described in Chapter 1, invalidated 
patents on naturally-occurring genomic compounds. My empirical strategy is to build a 
data set of the organizations that had at least one of their patents invalidated following the 
Myriad case, and compare their technology licensing activities before and after the case. 
 In my analysis, the central explanatory variable is “gene patent ratio”, i.e., the 
share of gene patents in the entire patent portfolio of the organization. I use it as a proxy 
for the number of organizational innovations that after the Myriad case are not patent 
protected any longer. I intend to investigate whether owning patent rights affects 
technology licensing behavior in firms. It is worthy of note that the simple count of gene 
patents is not an appropriate measure in this setting, since larger firms may lose a 
considerable number of patents, but given their enormous patent portfolios, their 
activities may not be affected by the loss; whereas losing a small number of patents could 
be consequential for small firms. 
 This section describes the data construction, empirical methods, and summary 
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statistics of the data set. I build the data set of the population of gene patent owners and 
match them with a sample of organizations that are not at risk of losing their patents after 
the Myriad case, but are similar to the “treated” organizations otherwise. 
 
Data Construction 
I exploit the population of gene patents assembled in Chapter 1 to construct the sample of 
gene patent owner organizations. I count each patent assignee as a separate gene patent 
owner. Next, I match the gene patent assignee names with Thomson Reuters Cortellis’s 
Competitive Intelligence database. Cortellis is a proprietary database that gathers data on 
biopharmaceutical firms from public records (e.g., company documents, press releases, 
regulatory filings) and then supplements them with data on therapeutic domains and 
technology types. It contains detailed data on biopharmaceutical companies, including 
their size, age, market portfolio, technology portfolio, patent portfolio, etc. 
 In constructing the gene patent owners’ sample, the organizations should satisfy 
three conditions. First, the patent owner should be an organizational entity. In the context 
of biopharmaceuticals, “individual” patent assignees are unlikely to be able to 
commercialize their gene-related inventions on their own. Thus, I drop the individual 
patent assignees that show up in the data set, often grouped with other organizations. 
Second, I check for pre-Myriad merger and acquisition deals and in such cases, aggregate 
the patents at the level of the parent company. For instance, in 2008, Takeda Oncology 
acquired Millennium Pharmaceuticals and obtained Millennium’s patent portfolio that 
included 343 gene patents. In my analysis, I combine Takeda’s original gene patents with 
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those of Millennium’s and consider them as part of Takeda’s entire patent portfolio. I 
drop the 54 patent assignees that I could not track after the Myriad case. These 
organizations may have suspended their activities in biopharmaceuticals or entirely. 
Finally, in the sample of gene patent owners, there exist organizations with gene patents 
accounting for only a minuscule fraction of their portfolios (in the order of tenths of a 
percent). To assure that the Myriad case was of importance for the organization, I set a 
lower threshold of 1 percent gene patents in the patent portfolio for including 
organizations in the sample. For example, only 0.1 percent of Pfizer’s patents were at risk 
of invalidation after the Myriad case. I assume, therefore, that the Myriad case has not 
affected Pfizer’s commercialization strategies. Pfizer’s financial data confirm the validity 
of this assumption. In the two-day window, before and after the Myriad case’s ruling 
announcement, Pfizer’s stock price does not significantly change (to be exact, it increases 
by 1.3 percent relative to NASDAQ index). In robustness checks, I relax this 1 percent 
threshold and find similar results. 
 I collect data on my primary outcome variable, technology licensing deals, from 
Cortellis’s Deals Intelligence database, which contains rich information on 92,531 deals 
in the biomedical sector. Cortellis’s categorization of deal types allows me to select only 
the technology licensing deals and avoid the deals that do not fall into the technological 
areas (e.g., mergers and acquisitions, joint ventures, distribution channels). Specifically, 
my sample of technology licensing deals comprises drug development and 
commercialization deals, drug early R&D, and exclusive and non-exclusive patent 
licensing deals. 
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 I also extract the control variables of my analysis from Cortellis. I use Cortellis’s 
patent database to generate the aggregate annual number of granted patents at the 
corporate level. I construct this measure to proxy both firm’s size and technology 
intensity. Considering the survey evidence on the dependence of biopharmaceuticals on 
patents to protect their inventions, using patents to measure size and technology level 
seems appropriate in my setting. I also collect data on the establishment date of 
organizations from Cortellis and when needed, I manually search for the establishment 
dates. According to Marx, Gans, and Hsu (2014), the firm’s commercialization strategy 
may be dynamic – initially entering markets for products to prove the validity of the 
technology and then switch back to licensing. Thus, I control for firms’ age in my 
analysis. Finally, to control for organizational diversification, I add the number of 
technological classes and key therapeutic areas in which firms are active, both extracted 
from Cortellis. I use the therapeutic areas again later as interaction terms to further 
explore the relationship between market safety and thickness. 
 As described in Section 3.3, a simple regression model of licensing deals and 
gene patent ratio can be endogenous. To mitigate the endogeneity concerns, I match my 
group of “treated” gene patent owner organizations with a control group of organizations 
that do not own gene patents, but are otherwise similar to the treated group. Cortellis 
provides data on a large set of biomedical firms, almost 170,000 organizations, which 
allows for using standard matching methods to find similar organizations. Section 3.2 
provides further descriptions and statistics of the constructed data set. 
 Before moving to the next section, I discuss a better variable that I could ideally 
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use to improve measuring the market thickness. For the dissertation, I measure market 
thickness by counting the number of firms in each market. In other words, I proxy the 
product market size for measuring the market thickness. In reality, however, large market 
size does not always lead to thick markets. In the same vein, small markets could be 
thick, under certain circumstances. To address this issue and for publication purposes, 
here I suggest a new variable for measuring the market thickness and explain my plan to 
collect data for that. 
 I intend to follow Agrawal, Cockburn, and Zhang (2015) in constructing the 
market thickness measure. In their survey analysis, Agrawal, Cockburn, and Zhang 
(2015) measure “lack of market thickness by whether respondents agree to the statement 
that [t]here are usually fewer potential buyers/sellers for the IP [relative to tangible 
assets]”. Unfortunately, my observational data do not allow me to compare the sales of 
tangible and intangible assets, let alone the number of potential buyers and sellers of 
these two types of assets. However, from Cortellis, I am able to collect data on patents in 
each technology market and identify those that are sold. My strategy to measure 
technology market thickness is to calculate the ratio of the sold patents to the entire 
number of patents in these markets. This measure can specify the extent to which 
intellectual property is “sellable” in each technology market, although a shortcoming of 
this measure, in comparison to that of Agrawal, Cockburn, and Zhang (2015), is its lack 
of measuring tangible assets. It is also worth mentioning that in compiling patent sales 
data, I will omit patent assignee changes that occur in settings other than technology 
markets, for example through firm acquisition and mergers, or name changes. 
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Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the data set of organizations with gene patents in 
their patent portfolio. As shown in Table 10, the sample of gene patent owner 
organizations covers a diverse set of organizations, with gene patent ratios in the range of 
1 percent up to two-thirds of the patent portfolio. An average gene patent owner has 
almost 10 percent of its patent portfolio on naturally-occurring genes. The sample 
contains different types of organizations: for-profit firms comprise 71 percent of the 
sample, while the remaining 29 percent are non-profits, including universities, hospitals, 
and governmental agencies. An average organization is 71 years old. Academic 
institutions are responsible for the relatively old age of the average organization. For the 
for-profit only sample, the average age is 36 with a standard deviation of 37 (not reported 
in the table). The sample is relatively diverse regarding patent portfolio size, with a 
minimum of 3 and maximum of 13,651 patents. An average firm has 309 patents. It also 
has 1 drug and in an average year signs 1 technology licensing deal. Finally, an average 
firm has developed technologies in 5 different technology classes and is active in 12 
markets. 
 
<Insert Table 10 here> 
 
 As I will discuss in Section 3.3, the statistical models that I run on the sample of 
gene patent owners could be endogenous. To address the endogeneity issues, I match the 
sample with a control group of non-gene patent owners. Table 11 presents the summary 
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statistics for a sample year before the Myriad case. Overall, 210 organizations are 
matched. Among these organizations, 85 percent are for-profit firms. An average firm in 
the matched sample has approximately 40 patents, has developed 0.28 drugs and annually 
signs 0.1 deals. The matched treatment and control groups are comparable and one 
cannot reject their similarity at the 95 percent significance level.  
 
<Insert Table 11 here> 
 
Model Specification 
To estimate the firm’s technology licensing rates, I specify the outcome variable as the 
logarithm of the successful annual technology licensing deals forged by any given firm 
plus one.  I use the logarithm function in the specification due to the skewed distribution 
of the outcome variable, which contains many zeros. Log transformation helps transform 
data to near-normal distribution. Employing an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression 
model, I assume the log of firm’s annual technology licensing deals 𝐿𝑖𝑡 to be a function 
of the firm’s gene patent ratio 𝐺𝑃𝑅𝑖𝑡 and other firm’s control variables 𝑋𝑖𝑡: 
log(𝐿𝑖𝑡) = 𝑓(𝐺𝑃𝑅𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑀𝑦𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡)
 
where 𝑡 indexes the year and 𝑖 indexes the firm. In this model, 𝛾𝑡 represents the year 
dummy variables that control for macro-level variations that affect all firms similarly and 
𝜃𝑖 is firm’s fixed-effects that capture firm’s time-invariant characteristics. 
 For estimating count variables, like in the case of my analysis, Poisson model is 
also suitable; especially in the cases of over-dispersion. However, in panel data, the 
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Poisson model omits the observations that have outcome variables equal to zero 
throughout. In my setting, with a matched control group and an outcome variable with 
many zeros, this feature could discard a considerable number of observations and bias the 
results towards firms with more licensing activities. Therefore, I do not use Poisson as 
my primary estimation model. In the robustness tests in Section 6, however, I show that 
the strong estimate holds when using Poisson. 
 The relationship between technology licensing rates and firm’s gene patent ratio 
in this statistical model, however, could be endogenous. Omitted variable bias could be 
one source of endogeneity. For instance, firms with a larger gene patent ratio may 
generally be less interested in licensing out their technologies. Claims on gene patents, as 
noted in Chapter 1, are usually defined broadly, are difficult to invent around, and in 
cases allow the owners to block the access of others to the genetic compound. Gene 
patent owners then may be motivated to use their patents to block others, instead of 
licensing them, and take their time to develop new products based on their gene patents; 
like Myriad allegedly did.  
 To alleviate the endogeneity concerns, I use coarsened- exact matching method 
(Iacus, King, & Porro, 2012) and compare the technology licensing rates of the gene 
patent owner organizations with those of a control group, matched on observable 
characteristics. I match on the following variables: firm’s patent portfolio size, 
organizational type (company, academic, nonprofit), pre-Myriad licensing behavior, and 
the number of developed drugs. My goal is to match organizations that are similar in 
type, size, and position in the value chain, i.e., R&D specialist or commercializing 
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organization. 
 In this set of analysis, I employ a difference-in-difference framework and study 
the licensing deals before and after the Myriad case. I assume that the Myriad case affects 
each organization proportional to the extent of its gene patent ratio, and leaves the 
organizations in the control group unaffected. Formally, I estimate the following model: 
log(𝐿𝑖𝑡) = 𝑓(𝐺𝑃𝑅𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑀𝑦𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡)
 
 This model is similar to the endogenous model that I introduced previously, but 
this time I run it for the matched sample, where 𝐺𝑃𝑅𝑖𝑡 is zero for the firms in the control 
group. The coefficient of 𝐺𝑃𝑅𝑖𝑡 will present the causal impact of firm’s patents on its 
licensing activity.  
 Finally, I explore the heterogeneity across a variety of gene-related markets by 
interacting each market with gene patent ratio to measure how market sizes moderate the 
impact of patents on licensing rates. The model specification is as follows: 
log(𝐿𝑖𝑡) = 𝑓(𝐺𝑃𝑅𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑖 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑀𝑦𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖 +  𝛾𝑡)
 
 Next section will describe the results of the discussed regressions. 
 
 
RESULTS 
 Results are presented in Table 12 for the gene patent owners’ sample and in Table 
4 for the matched sample of treated and control groups. Column 1 in Table 3 presents the 
simple estimates of regressing the technology licensing deals, in logarithm, over gene 
patent ratio on the pooled sample of gene patent owner firms over the period 2010–2017. 
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Consistent with my theoretical prediction, the strong negative estimate suggests that firms 
with larger shares of gene patents in their portfolios are less likely to reach technology 
licensing agreements. This negative relationship is also observable in Figure 5, 
illustrating the scatter plot of annual technology licensing deals against the gene patent 
ratio. Firms with smaller shares of gene patents, on average, sign more licensing deals 
annually. As the gene patent ratio increases, the licensing rates decline. The red line is the 
logarithmic trend line that I fit to the data, which indicates a negative correlation between 
gene patent ratio and technology licensing deals. 
 
<Insert Figure 5 here> 
 
 Column 2 in Table 12 adds control variables for the firm’s size and innovation 
intensity, patent portfolio size in logarithm, and the firm’s age and age-squared. 
Controlling for these variables intensifies the gene patent ratio’s coefficient. The control 
variables suggest that the larger and more mature firms are associated with higher rates of 
technology licensing. On average, 1 standard deviation increase in the size of the firm’s 
patent portfolio is associated with a 4 percent increase in the technology licensing deals. 
This figure for each one year more of age is 0.4 percent. Column 3 introduces two more 
time-invariant control variables that capture the number of technology classes that the 
firm develops and the number of markets in which the firm is active, respectively. The 
coefficient of technology class count is positive and significant, suggesting that firms 
with one more technology class have 2 percent more chance to strike a licensing deal. 
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This figure is negative, small, and insignificant for the firm’s market portfolio. In this 
specification, the relationship between gene patent ratio and technology licensing deals 
remains negative and statistically significant. Finally, Column 4 adds the firm’s fixed 
effects and year dummy variables to control for the variables that are constant within 
firms and panels. The estimate of the central variable, gene patent ratio, remains negative 
and significant at the 95 percent significance level. The coefficient suggests that each 
standard deviation increase in the gene patent ratio is correlated with a 25 percent 
decrease in the likelihood of technology licensing. 
 
<Insert Table 12 here> 
 
 As stated in Section 3, the relationship between gene patent ratio and technology 
licensing deals could be endogenous. To alleviate the endogeneity concerns, I use 
coarsened-exact matching method (Iacus, King, & Porro, 2012) and compare the 
technology licensing rates of the gene patent owner organizations with those of a control 
group, matched on observable characteristics. Table 13 presents the results of the analysis 
of this matched sample. Column 1 in Table 13 shows the result of a basic regression, 
employing a simple difference-in-difference framework, which merely contains the gene 
patent ratio in the model’s right-hand side. The coefficient is strong and negative, 
confirming my theoretical prediction that losing patent rights diminishes the chances of 
licensing technologies out. Column 2 adds the firm’s fixed effects to control for time-
invariant firm characteristics, which although slightly decreases the magnitude of the 
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effect, shows that the estimate remains statistically significant. Column 3 introduces the 
year dummy variables for the years 2010–2017 to control for the general time trends that 
affect all firms similarly. In this specification, as well, the coefficient of gene patent ratio 
remains strong and negative. Finally, Column 4 adds the time-varying control variables, 
i.e., the size of the firm’s patent portfolio, the firm’s age, and the firm’s age-squared. My 
estimate of interest in this more elaborate specification stays negative and significant as 
well. It suggests that a standard deviation increase in the gene patent ratio decreases the 
technology licensing rates by 8 percent, on average. I interpret this result as evidence of 
the negative impact that losing patent rights has on technology licensing deals. Consistent 
with the theory and prior empirical studies on Markets for Technology, I present findings 
that show the role that patent rights play in establishing functioning markets for 
technology and shaping the firms’ decision to engage in these markets. 
 
<Insert Table 13 here> 
 
 I also explore the dynamics of this effect, as illustrated in Figure 6. The figure 
plots the estimates of interacting gene patent ratio with dummy variables for each year, 
along with the 95 percent confidence interval around them. The trends show that before 
the Myriad case, the estimates are not strongly different from zero. However, following 
the Myriad case, the effect becomes evident in the downward slope of the estimates, 
showing that the treated firms with larger gene patent ratios engage in fewer 
technological licensing deals. This trend becomes significant in 2015 and is almost 
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invariably downward until 2017 when it finally shows signs of recovery. 
 
<Insert Figure 6 here> 
 
 Now turning attention to the markets in which firms are active, I examine the 
interaction terms of markets and gene patent ratio. For brevity, I do not present the 14 
tables that contain the results of interacting gene patent ratio with each gene-related 
market, and instead, I demonstrate the entire set of estimates in Figure 7. The data plotted 
in Figure 4 are the coefficients of the interaction terms, accompanied by the estimate plus 
and minus standard errors. These figures give a general sense of the magnitude of the 
coefficient and its significance. Two observations from the plot are worthy of note. First, 
all of the coefficients are negative, meaning that for the technology licensing activities of 
firms in gene-related markets, the impact of losing gene patents has generally been more 
deleterious. Consistent with conventional wisdom, the firms whose markets are 
associated with gene-based products and innovations are more intensely affected by the 
withdrawal of gene patents. Second, the interaction terms for the following markets 
appear to be statistically significant from zero: Genetic disorder, Musculoskeletal disease, 
Dermatological disease, Metabolic disorder, Respiratory disease, Immune disorder, 
Inflammatory disease, Neurological disease, Gastrointestinal disease, and Neoplasm. For 
the other therapeutic domains, however, I cannot reject the hypothesis that the technology 
licensing activities are affected more severely by the invalidation of gene patents. These 
domains include: Growth disorder, Psychiatric disorder, Hematological disorder, and 
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Rare diseases.  
 
<Insert Figure 7 here> 
 
 Finally, Figure 5 plots the coefficients of the market interaction terms against the 
size of those markets in logarithm. According to the theoretical arguments discussed in 
Section 2, I expect a negative relationship between the impact of patent rights on 
technology licensing and market size. In other words, I expect the licensing failures due 
to losing patent rights to be more severe in thick markets. The data, however, do not 
support this hypothesis. As shown in Figure 8, the estimates do not present any 
meaningful relationship with market size. Although I can fit a U-shaped trend line to 
explain almost 20 percent of the 14 estimates, the trend appears to be mainly driven by 
two therapeutic markets: Musculoskeletal disease and Metabolic disorder. Therefore, I 
am not currently able to reject the null hypothesis that there is no significant relationship 
between the estimates and market size. However, a potential avenue is to disaggregate 
therapeutic markets into subgroups. Increasing the number of therapeutic markets could 
help in finding trends in the data which will be a next step for this study. 
 
<Insert Figure 8 here> 
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ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
 Tables 5 and 6 report the results of the robustness tests. First, I relax the earlier 
assumption that the gene patents of organizations should comprise at least 1 percent of 
their patent portfolio to be considered in the sample. Adding organizations with below 1 
percent gene patents, I replicate Table 11 by running regressions on the entire population 
of the gene patent owners. The replication results are presented in Table 14. Unlike prior 
analyses, the coefficient of gene patent ratio is not significantly different from zero in 
Columns 1–3. I suspect this is due to the sizable amount of licensing activities in large 
companies that lost only a minuscule share of their patents after the Myriad case, but their 
licensing deals, not changed by the Myriad case, dominates the more severely affected 
organizations. This suspicion is supported by the results presented in Column 4 that adds 
the firm’s fixed-effects and year dummy variables. In Column 4, the coefficient of gene 
patent ratio is negative and strong. Furthermore, its magnitude is similar to that of the 
coefficient of gene patent ratio reported in Table 11. Since adding the firm’s fixed-effects 
estimates the growth (or decay) of the explanatory variable and not just its size, I interpret 
this similarity as evidence for the argument that the technology licensing activities of 
very large firms are not affected by the Myriad case. The results of the main specification 
are robust to relaxing the 1 percent gene patent ratio condition. 
 In addition, to check the sensitivity of the results to the regression model, I 
employ a Poisson model and re-run the regression for the more elaborate specification. 
The results of this regression are listed in Table 14, Column 5. Consistent with prior 
analysis, the coefficient of gene patent ratio is negative and statistically significant. I 
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report the incidence-rate ratios in brackets. The estimate in Column 5 suggests that losing 
1 standard deviation of the patent portfolio is associated with 18 percent less technology 
licensing deals. 
 
<Insert Table 14 here> 
 
 Table 6 presents the results of the robustness check for the CEM sample. One of 
my concerns with the difference-in-difference analysis is that the outlier data in both 
extremes have generated the strong results. To make sure this is not the case and the 
negative impact of patent invalidation on technology licensing deal is salient throughout 
the sample, I separate my matched sample in two sub-samples based on the 
organization’s patent portfolio size: I run the same difference-in-difference analyses for 
organizations with 10 patents and fewer, and those with more than 10 patents, separately. 
Since patent portfolio size was one of the variables on which I matched my sample, such 
a separation should not bias the results toward one end. Table 15 presents the results of 
the difference-in-difference framework for the two separate samples. 
 
<Insert Table 15 here> 
 
 Column 1 in Table 6 presents the estimates of the difference-in-difference 
analysis for the organizations with 10 or fewer patents, while Column 2 reports similar 
estimates for the organizations with more than 10 patents. Consistent with prior results, 
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the estimates of gene patent ratio are both negative. Since I cut the sample in half, the 
number of observations shrank significantly for each model leading to a decrease in the 
statistical significance of the estimates. Nonetheless, both estimates are significant at the 
90 percent level. I interpret these results as evidence of a real impact of patents on 
licensing rates, which is not driven by outliers at the two extremes. 
 
 
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 This study is not without limitations. First, I examine patent withdrawal in only 
one specific class of patents over naturally-occurring genes. One should be cautious 
about generalizing these findings to other settings. Despite my narrow focus, however, 
the precise identification of gene patents allows me to accurately estimate the extent to 
which patents affect the cooperative commercialization of innovation. Additionally, the 
natural experiment afforded by the Myriad case and the control group that I constructed 
using Cortellis’s rich data enable me to identify the causal impact of patents on 
technology markets.  
 The second limitation stems from the aggregation of patents and licensing deals at 
the corporate level.  This aggregation, although crucial for investigating the overall 
relationship between firm patents and technology licensing, could hide potential 
interesting nuances in the relationship. For instance, we do not know yet the extent to 
which losing a patent in a technology class affects technology licensing in that class, in 
similar classes, and dissimilar classes. The next step for this study could be to explore 
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these nuances. Cortellis’s Deals and Competitive Intelligence databases offer granular 
data on technology classes and medical indications associated with deals and patents. 
One could use these features to explore the variations in technologies and markets.  
 Finally, Market for Technology literature conceptually distinguishes between 
R&D specialists, those who develop technologies to license out, and established firms, 
those who license in technologies to commercialize. Some empirical studies have 
identified these different groups of firms in their settings to test the relevant theories (for 
example see Hall & Ziedonis, 2001). In the current version of the paper, I have not been 
able to make such a precise distinction among the firms in my sample. One research 
avenue is to identify these different types of organizations and examine the similarities 
and differences of the roles that patents play in the cooperative activities of each group. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 The last two decades have witnessed a growing interest in the markets for 
technologies and ideas, and the factors that help the functioning of these markets. 
Notably, the scholars have recently shown a particular interest in the role of technology 
markets in the vertical disintegration of industries, gains from technology trade, 
technology commercialization, and organization of innovation. Despite the foundational 
body of scholarship in this arena (Arora, Fosfuri, & Gambardella, 2001; Gans, Hsu, & 
Stern, 2002; Gans & Stern, 2003; Gans, Hsu, & Stern, 2008; Marx, Gans, & Hsu, 2014; 
Agrawal, Cockburn, & Zhang, 2015; Chatterji & Fabrizio, 2016), we still have limited 
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evidence on how factors like appropriability regimes, complementary assets, and 
bargaining costs affect the functioning of markets for technologies. Aiming to address 
this gap, this study takes advantage of a shift in the patentability of genomic compounds 
following the Myriad case and explores the consequences for technology licensing 
activities of the affected organizations. My findings support the theoretical arguments. 
After the Myriad case, I observe a significant decrease in the technology licensing rates 
of gene patent owner organizations, which persists over the four consecutive years 
covered in the data. Although heterogeneous in magnitude, the impact is observable in a 
variety of gene-related therapeutic markets. 
 This study also is an endeavor to combine two related but separate views on 
Market for Technology: one that considers IP rights, complementary assets, and 
bargaining costs as the factors shaping the technology markets, and another one that 
focuses on the structural market characteristics to examine the markets for technologies 
and ideas. Although at this stage, I do not find a meaningful relationship between the IP 
rights from the first perspective and market thickness from the second, this study calls for 
further theoretical and empirical work to explore the connections between the two 
perspectives. Such efforts can deepen our understanding of technology markets and how 
they work. 
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Figure 4. Partnership Deals in the Life Sciences Industry, 1993–2005 (Adopted from Scott 
Stern’s notes presented at the NBER Entrepreneurship Bootcamp, 2017) 
 
Figure 5. Technology Licensing Deals and Gene Patent Ratio, Gene Patent Owners Sample, 
2010–2017 
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Figure 6. Technology Licensing Rates and Gene Patent Ratio, Interactions with Years, 
CEM Sample, 2010–2017 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Technology Licensing Rates and Gene Patent Ratio, Interactions with Therapeutic 
Markets, CEM Sample, 2010–2017 
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Figure 8. Technology Licensing Rates and Gene Patent Ratios, Interactions with 
Therapeutic Markets against Market Size (log), CEM Sample, 2010–2017 
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VARIABLE Observation Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Min. Max. 
Sample includes 359 organizations, 2010–2017 
Gene Patent Ratio 2,879 0.09 .12 0.01 0.67 
For-Profit Organization 2,879 0.71 0.45 0 1 
Firm Age 1,920 70.77 74.53 2 425 
Technology Licensing Deals 2,879 0.89 1.88 0 20 
Patent Portfolio Size (log) 2,879 1.78 .74 .48 4.14 
Drugs (Developed and Under 
Development) 
2,879 1.07 3.90 0 115 
Technology Class Portfolio 
Size  
2,879 9.02 5.31 1 31 
Market Portfolio Size 2,879 13.40 11.66 1 72 
Table 10. Descriptive statistics for organizations with active gene patents in June 2013 
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 Treated Group (treated=1) 
 
Control Group (treated=0) 
  
VARIABLE Observation Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min. Max. 
 
Observation Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min. Max. 
 Mean 
Difference  
Gene Patent 
Ratio 
210 .13 .14 .01 .67 
 
210 0 0 0 0  -- 
Pre-Myriad 
Technology 
Licensing Deals 
(log) 
210 .10 .19 0 .95 
 
210 .15 .28 0 1.70  .04* 
Patent Portfolio 
Size (log) 
210 43.21 95.59 3 1,228 
 
210 38.52 73.00 0 806  -4.619 
Number of 
Developed 
Drugs 
210 .28 .41 0 1.65 
 
210 .28 .41 0 1.77  0.0003 
For-profit 
Organization 
210 .85 .35 0 1 
 
201 .86 .35 0 2  0.005 
• *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 11. Descriptive Statistics for the Matched data set, Separated by Treatment and Control Groups 
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VARIABLES 
(1) 
OLS 
 
Technology 
Licensing Deals 
(log) 
(2) 
OLS 
 
Technology 
Licensing Deals 
(log) 
(3) 
OLS 
 
Technology 
Licensing Deals 
(log) 
(4) 
OLS 
 
Technology 
Licensing Deals 
(log) 
Gene Patent 
Ratio 
-0.256*** 
(0.065) 
-0.555*** 
(0.083) 
-0.507*** 
(0.084) 
-0.25** 
(0.127) 
Annual Patent 
Portfolio Size 
(log) 
 
0.038*** 
(0.011) 
0.036*** 
(0.011) 
0.017 
(0.016) 
Firm’s Age  
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
-0.011 
(0.008) 
Firm’s Age ^ 2  
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
Technology 
Class Portfolio 
Size 
  
0.019*** 
(0.007) 
 
Market Portfolio 
Size 
  
-0.004* 
(0.003) 
 
Firm Fixed-
Effects 
No No No Yes 
Year Dummies No No No Yes 
Observations 2,520 1,680 1,680 1,680 
R-squared    0.008 
Number of firms 360 241 241 241 
Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
• Standard errors are clustered at the gene level 
 
Table 12. Number of Annual Technology Licensing Deals Signed by Firms as Licensors as a 
Function of Gene Patent Ratio, Gene Patent Owners Sample, 2010–2017 
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VARIABLES 
(1) 
OLS 
 
Technology 
Licensing Deals 
(log) 
(2) 
OLS 
 
Technology 
Licensing Deals 
(log) 
(3) 
OLS 
 
Technology 
Licensing Deals 
(log) 
(4) 
OLS 
 
Technology 
Licensing Deals 
(log) 
Gene Patent 
Ratio 
-0.06** 
(0.023) 
-0.05** 
(0.023) 
-0.07** 
(0.032) 
-0.08** 
(0.032) 
Annual Patent 
Portfolio Size 
(log) 
   
0.001** 
(0.052) 
Firm’s Age    
-0.045*** 
(0.008) 
Firm’s Age ^ 2    
-0.000 
(0.000) 
Firm’s Fixed-
Effects 
No Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies No No Yes Yes 
Observations 2,940 2,940 2,940 2,940 
R-squared  0.001 0.004 0.007 
Number of firms 420 420 420 420 
Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
• Standard errors are clustered at the gene level 
 
     
Table 13. Number of Annual Technology Licensing Deals Signed by Firms as Licensors as a 
Function of Gene Patent Ratio, CEM Sample, 2010–2017 
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VARIABLES 
(1) 
OLS 
 
Technology 
Licensing 
Deals (log) 
(2) 
OLS 
 
Technology 
Licensing 
Deals (log) 
(3) 
OLS 
 
Technology 
Licensing 
Deals (log) 
(4) 
OLS 
 
Technology 
Licensing 
Deals (log) 
(5) 
Poisson 
 
Technology 
Licensing 
Deals 
Gene Patent 
Ratio 
-0.005 
(0.016) 
0.0175 
(0.022) 
0.170 
(0.022) 
-0.25** 
(0.116) 
-0.20** 
[0.82] 
(0.089) 
Annual Patent 
Portfolio Size 
(log) 
 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.001** 
(0.000) 
-0.001 
(0.000) 
Firm’s Age  
0.002*** 
(0.000) 
0.002*** 
(0.001) 
-0.042*** 
(0.014) 
-0.037* 
(0.0206) 
Firm’s Age ^ 2  
-0.000*** 
(0.000) 
-0.000*** 
(0.000) 
0.000** 
(0.000) 
0.000*** 
(0.000) 
Technology 
Class Portfolio 
Size 
  
0.033*** 
(0.008) 
  
Market 
Portfolio Size 
  
-0.008*** 
(0.003) 
  
Firm Fixed-
Effects 
No No No Yes Yes 
Year Dummies No No No Yes Yes 
Observations 3,695 2,580 2,580 2,580 2,021 
R-squared    0.007  
Number of 
firms 
528 373 373 373 290 
Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
• Standard errors are clustered at the gene level 
 
Table 14. Number of Annual Technology Licensing Deals Signed by Firms as Licensors as a 
Function of Gene Patent Ratio, Gene Patent Owners Sample Including Below 1 Percent 
Gene Patent Ratios, 2010–2017 (Robustness Check)  
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VARIABLES 
(1) 
OLS 
 
Patent Portfolio Size ≤ 10 
 
Technology Licensing 
Deals (log) 
(2) 
OLS 
 
Patent Portfolio Size > 10 
 
Technology Licensing 
Deals (log) 
Gene Patent Ratio 
-0.04* 
(0.022) 
-0.11* 
(0.059) 
Annual Patent Portfolio Size 
(log) 
0.001 
(0.003) 
0.001** 
(0.000) 
Firm’s Age 
-0.01* 
(0.007) 
-0.051*** 
(0.003) 
Firm’s Age ^ 2 
0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
Firm’s Fixed-Effects Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes 
Observations 1,036 1,904 
R-squared 0.022 0.009 
Number of firms 148 272 
Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
• Standard errors are clustered at the gene level 
 
Table 15. Number of Annual Technology Licensing Deals Signed by Firms as Licensors as a 
Function of Gene Patent Ratio, CEM Sample, 2010–2017, Separate Subsamples Based on 
Patent Portfolio Size (Robustness Check)
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PROPRIETARY RIGHTS AND SCIENCE: EVIDENCE FROM THE 
INVALIDATED GENE PATENTS 
INTRODUCTION 
 On April 15, 2013, Dr. Arupa Ganguly, then an Associate Professor of Genetics 
in the University of Pennsylvania, entered the chamber of the U.S. Supreme Court to 
testify against the Myriad Genetics, Inc. for its alleged aggressive use of patent rights. 
Myriad, a Utah-based genetic diagnostic testing company, had successfully isolated two 
genes, BRCA1 and BRCA2, and had received patents on them. Mutations of BRCA1/2 
genes could help in predicting the susceptibility of patients to breast and ovarian cancer 
and by patenting these two genes, Myriad had created a near-monopoly situation in the 
diagnostic testing markets for these genes. In 1999, when Dr. Ganguly was doing 
research on the BRCA genes, she received a cease-and-desist letter from Myriad, 
requesting her to stop her research on these two genes. “I was very angry, to say the least. 
I was disappointed. I was sad”, says Ganguly. “But I had to go with it. No one was going 
to fight Myriad because, they thought, ‘A law is a law.’” (Offord, 2016). Dr. Ganguly 
stopped her research on the patented genes and began working only on the genes that 
were in the public domain. 
 Restrictions that patents on research inputs could cause for scientific discovery, 
like the problem that Dr. Ganguly experienced, have ignited a vigorous debate. 
Supporters and critics have repeatedly raised arguments in favor of or against the role that 
patents play in the process of scientific research. Empirical studies provide mixed 
findings. In some cases, they report the negative impact of patents on science (e.g. 
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Murray & Stern, 2007; Murray et al., 2008), in some other cases they find no significant 
impact (e.g. Walsh et al., 2003; Sampat & Williams, 2018), and in some others they 
present evidence of the positive impact (e.g. Fehder et al., 2014). 
 Building on this literature, this chapter investigates whether and the extent to 
which granting patent rights to research materials could affect scientific progress. I 
examine this relationship in the context of genetic compounds. Two months after Dr. 
Ganguly’s testimony, in June 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court rendered verdict on the 
patent-eligibility of isolated genes. Addressing the Myriad case, the U.S. Supreme Court 
ruled that genes are parts of nature and, therefore, are not patent-eligible subject matter. 
This ruling suddenly and surprisingly invalidated the patent claims over more than 5,000 
genes. I exploit this ruling as a quasi-experiment to explore the causal impact that gene 
patents may have on the scientific progress. 
 From a research design perspective, Myriad case is particularly useful for 
addressing the debate on patents and science. First, the ruling was not anticipated by the 
gene patent owners. As discussed in Chapter 2, both qualitative and quantitative evidence 
supports the presence of the element of surprise. Second, while the ruling invalidated 
patent claims on isolated genes, it excluded another type of genomic compounds, called 
complementary DNAs (cDNAs) on the grounds that these compounds are synthesized in 
the lab and are not naturally-occurring. I take advantage of this feature to create a control 
group comprising patented human genes that besides isolated genes claim cDNAs as well 
and thus could retain their patent protection after Myriad case, even if partially. This 
control group creates a baseline of comparison with a treatment group consisting of the 
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patented human genes for which only the isolated gene is claimed and therefore have lost 
their patent protection after the ruling.  
 Using these control and treatment groups and the surprising ruling, as established 
in Chapter 2, that invalidated the isolated gene patents, I employ a difference-in-
difference framework to examine the causal impact of gene patents on multiple science-
related outcome variables. First, I study the causal impact of patents on the gene-related 
publication rates. I explore the consequences of the withdrawal of patents on genes on the 
global publications, publications with corresponding authors in the US, and articles 
published in specific scientific journals with high impact factor. I aim to find whether 
Myriad case had a global or national effect on the publication rates. Furthermore, it may 
be the case that higher quality studies, published in high impact factor journals, were 
affected differently from the rest of the studies. Second, I perform similar analyses to 
study the impact of patents on the scientists’ chances of receiving research grants. The 
idea is to find whether having open access to isolated genes has enabled scientists to 
generate stronger research ideas and more rigorous research proposals. Finally, I turn my 
attention to the direction of research and study whether the patent invalidation of genes 
has caused any systematic changes in the scope of scientific papers.  
 Collecting a data set comprising the population of gene patents and publication 
information on gene-related papers in the PubMed database, I test the impact of isolated 
gene patents on scientific progress. My analyses show little to no evidence of gene 
patents affecting science. Unlike Chapters 2 and 3, I find the impact of gene patents on 
the follow-on publications, grants, and scope of the studies to be indiscernible. These 
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findings are consistent with prior qualitative and quantitative studies on gene patents. In 
their survey of patented research inputs, Walsh et al. (2003) find little concern in the 
university community when their research inputs are patented. According to their 
respondents, the standard strategy is to ignore patents. In the rare cases where patent 
owners raise concerns for patent infringement, the university IP office would write a 
letter to the patent owner reading that the patented invention is only used for research 
purposes. Sampat and Williams (2017), also, find that successful for genetic compounds 
have had insignificant effects on gene-related publication rates compared to unsuccessful 
patent applications. My study joins these two studies and contributes novel empirical 
evidence showing that not only gene patent withdrawal has left indiscernible impacts on 
publication rates, but it also has had trivial impacts on the research grants and research 
scopes. The dissimilarity between the findings of this chapter and those of Chapters 2 and 
3 is further evidence of the differences between the norms of industry and science. 
 The paper proceeds as follows: Section 4.2 describes the theoretical arguments 
and reviews the literature on the relationship between patents and science. Section 4.3 
introduces the empirical context, the collected data set, and the empirical methodology, 
while Section 4.4 presents the results. Section 4.5 presents the robustness check analyses 
and Section 4.6 discusses the limitations of the study. Section 4.7 concludes. 
 
 
  
93 
THEORY 
 The impact of patents on the progress of scientific discovery has been the subject 
of a heated debate during the past decades. On one side, the supporters of the stimulating 
impact of patents on science highlight the role of patents in incentivizing further research 
on the patented discoveries (Kitch, 1977) and accelerating the transfer of scientific 
knowledge to the private sector for development and commercialization (Arora et al., 
2001; Gans & Stern, 2003). On the other side, critics underline the exclusionary aspects 
of patent rights that may limit the progress of “open” science. This perspective 
underscores the different norms that are in place for basic and applied research. While in 
basic research full disclosure of theories, data, and findings through publication is 
encouraged and rewarded (through mechanisms such as tenure), it is advised for the 
findings of applied research to be disclosed through IP-protected mechanisms or kept 
secret entirely to secure the returns. 
 Whether patents stimulate or stifle scientific growth is even more contentious in 
the cases of scientific fields that fall into the Pasteur’s Quadrant (Stokes, 1997). In 
Stokes’s taxonomy, Pasteur’s Quadrant entails the scientific research that is inspired by 
practical use. This type of research is fundamentally different from those that are 
performed purely for pushing the boundaries of science (Bohr’s Quadrant) and those that 
are done only for their application, with little or no concern about the underlying science 
(Edison’s Quadrant). In cases where the outcomes of research have implications for both 
pure scientific quest and applied research, researchers may be motivated to protect their 
findings with formal IP tools, most notably patents. This may create obligations for the 
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scientists who want to use or build upon these patented research findings. In some cases, 
these obligations may lead to restrictions on subsequent scientific studies and could result 
in limiting or significantly delaying the progress of scientific research.  
 In the life sciences, many studies exemplify basic research inspired by practical 
use – i.e. Pasteur’s Quadrant research. In Stokes’ words, “[t]he revolution in molecular 
biology has posed questions, such as how interferon works, that were enormously 
important both for the advance of fundamental knowledge on recombinant DNA and for 
major applications – some of which will be immensely profitable”. The gene, as one of 
the fundamental elements of biology research, was among the main discoveries with 
these dual uses in life sciences. On the one hand, following Watson and Crick’s seminal 
work in 1953 that described the double-helical structure of Deoxyribose Nucleic Acid 
(i.e. DNA), many scientists built their entire careers on studying genes. Generations of 
scientists dedicated immeasurable amounts of time and resources to investigate how 
genes work, what proteins they express, and where in the DNA each gene is located. 
These studies have fundamentally deepened our understanding of how the human body 
works. On the other hand, gene-related products and services such as diagnostic tests and 
genetic therapeutics have proven to be significant sources of profit. The relatively short 
history of biotechnology is filled with blockbuster genetic tests and drugs that have 
brought their investors huge returns. Amgen’s erythropoietin (EPO) is one example. 
Erythropoietin gene is produced in the kidney and expresses proteins that help increase 
the red blood cells. By successfully isolating this gene from the DNA and patenting it, 
Amgen managed to secure profits both from producing the genetically engineered drug, 
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Epogen, used to treat anemia, and from licensing it for other uses to Johnson & Johnson. 
One study estimated that by 1997, Amgen’s patent was generating more than a billion 
dollars annually for Amgen (Marshall, 1997). 
 The human gene, therefore, is representative of chemical compounds that fall into 
the Pasteur’s Quadrant. Any comprehensive economic analysis of genes should consider 
their value for pure science. In the next section, I discuss the economic implications of 
basic research. 
 
The Economics of Basic Research 
The economic analyses of basic research date back at least to 1950s. In his foundational 
work, Richard Nelson (1959) examines whether the U.S. Post World War II investment 
in basic research has been sufficient. Since science is a “non-excludable” and “non-
rivalrous” public good, investments in basic research, particularly by the private sector, 
may pose a dilemma. When produced, science can be easily used by any other entity at 
almost zero marginal cost (of course, ignoring absorptive capacity (Cohen & Levinthal, 
1990) for the purposes of this argument). Nelson (1959) provides examples of basic 
research contributing to technological breakthroughs and offers an explanation on why 
firms, especially those with larger product portfolios and broader technological base, 
have incentives to invest in basic research. He also calls for larger governmental 
investments in scientific progress. 
 Arrow (1962) continues the economic discussion on investment in basic research 
by explaining the resource allocation problem with the uncertainty that is intrinsic to the 
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basic research. He provides incentivizing models for effective allocation of resources for 
inventive activities. On the social side of basic research, Merton (1973) introduces other 
non-economic aspects of scientific research that may incentivize scientists to openly 
publish their research. This line of research took new directions when new policy shifts 
happened in the 1980s. 
 In the year 1980, multiple high-profile rulings and regulations shifted the 
patentability landscape. With the passage of Bayh-Dole Act in 1980, universities received 
the permission to patent their publicly funded inventions. This, among other factors, 
resulted in an upsurge in patenting activities for both universities that were active in 
patenting the faculty inventions prior to Bayh-Dole Act (e.g. Stanford University and 
University of California) and those that were not (e.g. Columbia University) (Mowery et 
al., 2001). In the life sciences, this trend was exacerbated after the U.S. Supreme Court 
ruling on Diamond v. Chakrabarty in 1980, which considered live organisms as patent-
eligible subject matter. As the biotechnology industry was starting to grow, 
biotechnology firms and universities began to file patent applications for isolated genes, 
methods of isolation and genetic testing. 
 Concerned about the upsurge in patenting biomedical research inputs, Heller and 
Eisenberg (1998) develop their “anticommons” theory suggesting that the existence of 
concurrent intellectual property rights, such as patents, can impede follow-on scientific 
progress and innovation. According to this theory, innovation is a cumulative process 
(Scotchmer, 1991) and innovators need to build upon prior innovations. When multiple 
patents protect prior innovations, transaction costs could increase significantly and hinder 
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innovators from developing subsequent innovations (Heller & Eisenberg, 1998; Shapiro, 
2000). Merges and Nelson (1990) and Scotchmer (1991) show that in some cases, for 
patents to impede follow-on research and innovation, even fragmentation is not a 
necessary condition. Even one patent, if broad enough and in the upstream of sequential 
innovation, could stifle subsequent innovations, according to Merges and Nelson (1990) 
and Scotchmer (1991). 
 Empirical studies that test the premises of the anticommons theory provide mixed 
results. Walsh et al. (2003) interview university scientists, business managers, and IP 
attorneys in biopharmaceuticals in search for evidence of patents impeding science and 
innovation. Their findings show that although in cases biomedical patents have imposed 
costs and delays in commercialization activities, university research has been largely 
exempted from these costs. With the notable exception of university clinical testing 
activities, patents have rarely blocked scientific research. According to Walsh et al. 
(2003), in most cases, patent owners were lenient when exercising their patent rights 
against universities. Starting legal disputes with universities could cause reputational 
damages that were hard to compensate. Also, patent owners could benefit from scientific 
research done on their innovations and use it to facilitate the development of the next 
generations. 
 Comparing publications that receive patents on their discoveries with those that 
do not, however, Murray and Stern (2007) find modest but persistent chilling effects of 
patents on the citations received by their corresponding papers. They take forward 
citations to a paper as a proxy for the scientific effort that builds upon that paper and 
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report that after patents are granted to scientific innovations, already published in papers, 
the average citation rates declined by 10–20 percent. Similar declines in publication rates 
are reported by Murray et al. (2016) for articles that use a patented genetically engineered 
mouse, Oncomouse, and by Williams (2013) who investigates a non-patent, contractual 
form of IP between the Human Genome Project and a private company, Celera. 
 Fehder et al. (2014) build on Murray and Stern’s (2007) methodology and 
examine the effect of patents granted on the published scientific inventions in longer 
periods of time. They report a short-term chilling effect of patents on follow-on citations, 
consistent with the findings of Murray and Stern (2007), which then entirely reverses in 
the long term. According to Fehder et al. (2014) the papers that receive a patent on their 
inventions receive more citations, after a few years of decline, which are concentrated 
more in the studies published by the authors affiliated with similar institutions (private 
sector authors citing private sector authors and public sector authors citing public sector 
authors). Their analysis shows the impact of patents not only on downstream research, 
but also on the organization of downstream projects depending on the public or private 
institution that the researchers are affiliated with. Using a similar approach, Thompson, 
Ziedonis, and Mowery (2018) provide new empirical evidence for this debate by studying 
patented university discoveries and underlining the role that Material Transfer 
Agreements (MTAs) play in the follow-on citations received by the patent-paper pairs. 
They report a positive impact of patents on citations received by the papers that do not 
have MTAs for their offered research inputs. In contrast, the papers with patented 
discoveries that have MTAs experience a decline in their follow-on citations. 
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 Finally, Sampat and Williams (2018) study the impact of patents on genetic 
compounds on the subsequent publication rates and commercialized innovations. Their 
analyses show no significant difference between the successful and unsuccessful gene 
patent applications in terms of the published scientific articles, developed diagnostic tests 
and manufactured therapeutic drugs. Sampat and Williams’s (2018) work is of particular 
importance for my paper, since the subject of their study, gene patents, is similar to what 
I study in this paper. I exploit my quasi-experimental setting to contribute novel empirical 
evidence to this debate and explore other parameters that may also affect the progress of 
science, namely winning research grants and expansions in the scope of papers. 
 To make progress with their research, scientists often need financial grants to 
purchase the necessary lab equipment and data, cover their traveling expenses for data 
collection and presenting their works, hire research assistants and doctoral students, etc. 
In fact, one of the primary goals of the governmental agencies like National Science 
Foundation (NSF) and National Institute of Health (NIH) is to provide financial support 
for scientists in the form of research grants. The application process for these grants often 
includes a research proposal, time plan, and the expected financial needs. The proposals 
are weighed against each other and in a competitive process, their authors may become 
eligible for receiving a grant. Each year, NSF and NIH collectively provide more than 
$30 billion to foster basic and applied research (Jacob & Lefgren, 2011). 
 Receiving research grants can increase the productivity of scientists (Lerner, 
2000; Arora & Gambardella, 2005). Having access to research inputs, like genes, may 
open new avenues for more impactful research and stronger research proposals. 
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Therefore, the increase in accessibility of genetic compounds may enable scientists to 
win more research grants for their studies.   
 Moreover, gaining access to fundamental research inputs, such as genes, can 
create novel opportunities for scientific exploration and enable the scientists to shift their 
resources towards studies with broader scopes. In this perspective, withdrawal of patents 
on isolated genes may affect not only the rate but also the direction of scientific 
discovery. After the sudden “gene openness shock” following Myriad case, the scientists 
may have become able to increase the rate and scope of their genetic experiments and 
explore wider scientific landscapes. 
 
 
DATA AND METHODS 
Data Construction 
I use the population of gene patents compiled in Chapter 2 to construct the sample of my 
patented genes. I then merge this data set with data on gene-related scientific 
publications. I compile the publication data set using the PubMed database. PubMed 
comprises more than 28 million citations for publications in life sciences journals and 
biomedical literature. Each PubMed record provides rich information on biomedical 
publications including but not limited to the article title, journal title and ISSN, authors 
list, affiliation information for the corresponding author, abstract text, chemical elements 
used in the study, and Medical Subject Headings (MeSH) that constitute a hierarchical 
terminology for indexing and classification of biomedical articles. To make sure that the 
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data set contains only the articles that may be affected by gene patents in the years before 
and after Myriad case, I focus only on the PubMed articles that have “DNA” as part of 
their chemicals list and are published in the years between 2010 and 2017. This method 
confirms that at least one DNA subject matter has been used in the study and, unlike 
studies like literature reviews that may refer to genes without actually using them, the 
selected articles are indeed at risk of being affected by gene patents. The resulting gene-
related paper data set contains 186,256 articles published in 3,574 scientific journals. 
Table 16 presents the list of top-30 journals with the highest number of gene-related 
publications in the period of my study.  
 
<Insert Table 16 here> 
 
 Using the PubMed data, I create three outcome variables to examine the science-
related impacts of the withdrawal of gene patents. I aim to investigate the potential 
impacts that the wholesome withdrawal of gene patents has had on scientific progress. If 
the invalidation of the isolated DNA patents reduces barriers for scientists, the 
publication rates should increase in the treatment group relative to the control group after 
the Myriad ruling. To test this potential ruling, I first investigate whether there are 
significant differences between the article counts related to the genes in the treatment 
group and those in the control group. In other words, I examine the impact of invalidating 
gene patents on gene-related publication rates. For these analyses, every article that uses 
DNA and includes the name of a patented gene (either gDNA or cDNA) in its title or 
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abstract adds an extra point to the outcome variable. I run a script to search for the 
symbols of patented gene in the titles and abstracts of the selected PubMed articles to 
identify publications associated with each gene at each year. Since the data set contains 
panels of gene-related articles published from 2010–2017, the outcome variable is an 
article count per year variable.  
 To identify the potential impacts on more granular levels, I run similar analyses 
on three separate sub-samples. First, I focus on the articles whose corresponding author is 
affiliated with a research organization (university, governmental agency, private sector, 
etc.) in the U.S. Since the legal verdict in the Myriad case governs rights only in the 
United States, Supreme Court’s ruling should be more salient for the U.S.-based 
scientists and laboratories. Second, the impact may be different for high-quality papers 
that are published in scientific journals with high impact factors. To identify these 
journals, I use Thompson, Ziedonis, and Mowery’s (2018) data and select the life science 
journals with the impact factors higher than 10. The list of the high impact factor journals 
is provided in Table 16. Finally, I focus on the publications from the universities that 
have a genetic testing clinic. Universities that own genetic testing facilities could attract 
patients and restrict the profitability of the gene patent owner diagnostic firms. Thus, it 
could be the case that gene patent owners enforce their patent rights more aggressively 
against the universities with genetic testing clinics. This may restrict the access of the 
scientists in these universities to genomic materials and may result in limitations in their 
gene-related publication rates.   
 For my second outcome variable, I focus on the grants earned by researchers to 
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perform their study. PubMed data provide the identification number, agency, and the 
country that provides the research grants. I use the number of grants received for the 
papers associated with each gene to estimate the impact of gene openness on the quality 
of research ideas and proposals. Finally, my third outcome variable is the number of new 
MeSHs. MeSHs, similar to keywords in management and economics papers but more 
structured, demonstrate the topics discussed in biomedical papers. Unlike keywords, for 
which the author has considerable autonomy in selecting the terms, MeSHs are structured 
vocabulary that the U.S. National Library of Medicine (NLM) created and updates. The 
MeSHs of an article, therefore, could show the article’s topics and I use their counts as a 
proxy of the scope breadth of the article. 
 In order to capture the heterogeneity across genes in terms of their scientific 
value, I use the gene ranking assembled by Kerpedjiev (2017) based on scientific 
citations to each gene. I group the genes into three categories: elite genes, that are at the 
top quarter of the ranking, critical genes that are below top quarter and above bottom 
quarter of the gene ranking list, and finally non-critical genes that are at the bottom 
quarter of the ranking list. I run the regressions for each of these categories to explore 
potential differences among the three.   
 Next section presents further descriptions and statistics of the constructed 
database. 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 17 presents the descriptive statistics for the variables used in this study. All data are 
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collected in 8 panels – the years between 2010 and 2017, inclusive. The patented genes 
are the entire set of genes patented during the years between 1993 and 2013. My data set 
contains 5,370 patented genes with 5,144 patented isolated genes in the treatment group 
and 226 patented cDNAs and isolated genes in the control group. 
 
<Insert Table 17 here> 
 
 The entire set of gene-related publications contains more than 213,000 articles. 
Searching for the patented genes in the title and abstract of these articles results in 87,803 
papers, which is 2.04 articles for each gene per year on average. This figure for the 
sample of articles with US-based primary authors is 0.28 and for articles with US-based 
primary authors and published in high impact factor journals is 0.43 articles for each gene 
per year. Also, on average, the figures for research grants and MeSHs are 0.41 and 4.59, 
respectively. 
 During the years between 2010 and 2017, the global publication rates do not 
significantly change. As shown in Figure 9, after two years of growth, the publication 
counts reach a steady state with small ups and downs. These statistics, however, are 
strikingly different for the articles whose primary authors are located in the US. As 
presented in Figure 10 the number of gene-related articles experiences a short-lived jump 
in 2012, but the real growth starts in 2014 (right after Myriad case) when the publication 
count grows from ~400 in 2014 to ~3,500 in 2017. Difference-in-difference estimator can 
show whether this growth could be explained, at least partially, by the withdrawal of gene 
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patents or it is just the normal scientific growth and is not necessarily affected by Myriad 
case.   
 
<Insert Figure 9 here> 
 
<Insert Figure 10 here> 
 
Model Specification 
To estimate the publication rates at the aforementioned levels, i.e., global, US-based, high 
impact factor, and clinic-owning universities, I specify the outcome variable as the 
number of the annual PubMed articles for any given gene, at each level.  Similar to my 
analyses in Chapter 2, in this analysis I use Poisson Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood 
Estimator that relaxes the equality assumption between mean and variance (Cameron & 
Trivedi, 2013). I also use Poisson Fixed Effects with robust standard errors that according 
to Wooldridge (1999) consistently estimates the parameter of interest. I assume the 
annual publication rates at each level 𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛_𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖 to be a function of whether the 
patented gene has a cDNA claim, that is whether it is in the treatment or control group 
(𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖). 
 
𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛_𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑖 = 𝑓(𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑀𝑦𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑑𝑡 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡) 
where 𝑡 indexes the year and i indexes the gene. In this model, 𝛾𝑡 represents the year 
dummy variables that control for the macro-level variations that affect all genes similarly 
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and 𝜃𝑖 is gene fixed-effects that capture gene’s time-invariant characteristics. The 
coefficient of the treated variable after the Myriad case is the difference-in-difference 
estimator.  
 I run similar regression models for my other outcome variables, research grants, 
MeSHs, and for different types of genes (elite, critical, and non-critical) to estimate the 
impact of the gene patent withdrawal on them. 
 
 
RESULTS 
Gene Patents and Publication Rates 
My first set of analyses examines the impact of the invalidation of isolated gene patents 
on the number of published papers that study those genes. I run Poisson regressions on 
the article counts per gene per year. Table 18 presents the results of these regressions. In 
model (1), the sample includes the entire set of PubMed articles from 2010-2017 that 
report “DNA” as a chemical element in the study. These papers are published in different 
journals around the world and I do not discriminate based on the location of the author. 
Although the U.S. Supreme Court ruling on Myriad case is only valid in the US, running 
the regression on the entire global sample has multiple benefits. First, the science 
network is indeed a global network. Scientists from different countries repeatedly create 
collaboration networks and a scientist’s gaining or losing access to research inputs could 
create or dismantle her coauthorship network. Vakili et al. (2015), for instance, report 
that after the Bush administration cut funding on STEM cell research, American 
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scientists started new collaborations with researchers from other countries that had access 
to STEM cell research funding. Gaining access to isolated genes, therefore, may have 
created new opportunities for researchers in other countries that still consider isolated 
genes as patent-eligible subject matter.  
 
<Insert Table 18 here> 
 
 Second, having a baseline of global gene-related publication rates enables me to 
compare and contrast my findings in the U.S. with an international scientific reference 
group that may be illuminative, given that the gene patent laws in the other parts of the 
world have remained relatively constant (Australia is a notable exception). The results 
presented in model 1, Table 18, show non-statistically significant coefficients for the 
treatment group, meaning that I am not able to reject the null hypothesis that the global 
publication rates for the genes with invalidated patents are similar to those that retained 
their patent protection. This result is confirmed by the plot presented in Figure 11. 
 
<Insert Figure 11 here> 
 
 In Model (2), I limit my sample only to the papers whose corresponding authors 
reside in the U.S. These are the researchers who are legally allowed to freely study the 
genes that were patent protected before Myriad case. Note that, given the PubMed data 
limitations, I am currently able to only extract the location of the primary authors and not 
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the coauthors. This limitation is discussed in Section 6 and solutions that will be used in 
the future versions of the paper are mentioned. For the papers with US-based primary 
authors, the results show similar statistically insignificant coefficients. I am again not 
able to reject the hypothesis that article counts published by US-based authors are 
different in the treatment and control groups after the invalidation of isolated gene 
patents. Figure 12 presents the time trends for the “treated” coefficients over the years 
2010–2017. As depicted in Figure 12, the estimates are never significantly different from 
zero in any years before or after Myriad case. I interpret these results as consistent with 
the prior studies that suggest indiscernible effects of gene patents on the progress of 
science.  
 
<Insert Figure 12 here> 
 
 Finally, I examine the impact of gene patents on the scientific articles only 
published in the journals with high impact factor. In this case, the coefficients are 
statistically significant at the 95 percent level. This result shows that on average and 
considering everything else constant, the gene-related publications by US-based authors 
in high impact factor journals have increased by 65 percent after the invalidation of 
isolated gene patents. Although this result is consistent with the idea that gene patents 
may have limited the “high quality” research, plotting the estimates over the years shows 
that in none of the years this difference has been statistically significant. In other words, 
although the aggregate of publications by US-based authors in high impact factor journals 
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is different for the treatment and control groups after the ruling, this difference is not 
evident in any specific year in the time period. I interpret this finding as evidence 
supporting the notion that isolated gene patents may have created a difference in the level 
of high impact factor scientific publications, but the rates have remained unchanged. 
 
<Insert Figure 13 here> 
 
Gene Patents and Research Grants 
I now turn my attention towards research grants that the gene researchers have received. 
The intention here is to learn whether withdrawing patent protection from isolated genes 
has caused any meaningful differences in the research ideas and the quality of research 
grant proposals resulting in winning more research grants. I limit my sample to the gene-
related studies by US-based primary authors that may have been affected by the Myriad’s 
ruling. In Table (19) Model (1) the result of the withdrawal of isolated gene patents on 
the grants received by the entire set of US-based primary authors whose published gene-
related article is included in the PubMed database is presented. The coefficient, although 
positive, is statistically insignificant, meaning that I cannot reject the null hypothesis that 
the number of research grants received by the authors that do research on invalidated 
gene patents is similar to the number of grants received by those who work on not 
invalidated gene patents. This finding is plotted over the years between 2010 and 2017 in 
Figure (14). 
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<Insert Table 19 here> 
 
<Insert Figure 14 here> 
 
 
  In Model (2), I limit my sample to the articles published in the high impact factor 
scientific journals. Naturally, these studies are more prone to having received research 
grants. However, since my control and treatment groups are selected only on the basis of 
having cDNA claims, this should not have biased my results. Similar to my analyses of 
the publication rates, the coefficient here is also significant at the 95 percent level. 
However, as shown in Figure (15), the year-specific coefficients are not statistically 
significant in any given year in my panels. Again, I interpret this as evidence supportive 
of an overall impact of gene patents on winning research grants which may not 
significantly affect the rate of gaining research grants per year.    
 
<Insert Figure 15 here> 
 
GenePatents and the Medical Subject Headings (MeSH) 
Next, I focus on the Medical Subject Headings (MeSH) and whether their numbers have 
expanded following the invalidation of isolated gene patents. As shown in Table (20) 
Model (1), for the entire set of PubMed publications done by US-based authors, the result 
is not statistically significant. The coefficients are never statistically significant, neither in 
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aggregate nor per year as shown in Figure (16). Therefore, I am not able to reject the null 
hypothesis that the withdrawal of patents on isolated genes has not opened the way for 
expanding the scope of gene-related studies. In other words, I am not able to claim that 
the direction of research, at least in terms of broadening the scope of studies, has changed 
after the invalidation of isolated gene patents. 
 
<Insert Table 20 here> 
 
<Insert Figure 16 here> 
 
 For the papers published in the high impact factor journals, however, the 
coefficient is significant at the 95 percent level. While the before- and after-Myriad 
publications show strong differences at the aggregate level, I do not observe any 
significant impact in the annual trends. Figure 17 plots the interaction terms of the 
difference-in-difference estimate with year dummy variables, along with the 95 percent 
confidence intervals around them. In none of the years before or after the Myriad case, I 
see a significant difference between the publication rates for the treatment and control 
groups. 
 
<Insert Figure 17 here> 
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Heterogeneous Gene Scientific Values 
Finally, I explore the potential differences among genes with different scientific values 
and present the results in Table 21. In this table, Panel A includes the results of the 
difference-in-differences framework for the elite genes, with top 25 percent citation rates. 
Panels B and C present the results of the same analysis for critical and non-critical genes, 
respectively. As shown in Table 21, none of the estimates are significant at the 5 percent 
level. For none of the gene categories, I am able to reject the hypothesis that the scientific 
research, grants, and MeSHs, have significantly changed after the invalidation of gene 
patents. 
 
<Insert Table 21 here> 
 
ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
 I test the robustness of my results by employing a negative binomial regression 
model. Negative binomial model is useful particularly when the outcome variable is over-
dispersed. The descriptive statistics presented in Table 17 show the sizable differences 
between the means and the standard deviations for outcome variables which confirm their 
over-dispersion. Table 22 shows the results of the difference-in-difference framework for 
testing the impact gene patent withdrawal on the subsequent publication rates. Similar to 
the estimations of the Poisson model presented in Table 18, the coefficients are 
statistically insignificant. I am not able to reject the null hypothesis of the similarity of 
gene-related publications between the treatment and control groups. I find similar results 
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when testing for the impact of gene patent invalidation on research grants and MeSHs. 
None of the estimates presented in Tables 23 and 24 is statistically significant at the 95 
percent significance level, meaning that I cannot reject the similarity hypothesis of the 
outcomes for the treatment and control groups. 
 
<Insert Table 22 here> 
 
<Insert Table 23 here> 
 
<Insert Table 24 here> 
 
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 Like any other study, my analyses are limited in scope. First, this study examines 
the invalidation of a specific type of IP rights on genomic compounds, i.e. gene patents. 
While this setting allows for carefully identifying a large population of these patents in a 
standard, replicable, and straight-forward manner, some specific features are unique to 
gene patents and one should be cautious about generalizing the findings. One main 
feature of gene patents is that they are generally broad in scope and it is more difficult to 
invent around them. Genetic compounds, such as sequences and recombinant proteins, 
are so basic that in most cases, creating a replicate or a substitute for them is extremely 
costly and difficult, if not entirely impossible (Merz & Cho, 2005). This feature is 
dissimilar to the other types of patents, in which case, inventing around is usually 
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considered a doable and recommended approach to continue the competition with patent 
owners (Graham et al., 2009). 
 Second, my study suffers from data limitations that are inherent in the PubMed 
database. One of the shortcomings of the PubMed database is that it enlists the affiliation 
information only for the paper’s primary author. For the other authors, the affiliations and 
countries of residence are unknown; meaning that the coauthors may be located in the 
U.S. while the primary author is outside the U.S. and, therefore, the paper, while 
potentially affected by Myriad case, is not considered in my analyses. Moreover, an 
interesting avenue for future research is to examine the coauthorship networks that are 
built or terminated due to policy changes, like Myriad case. Azoulay et al. (2010) show 
coauthorship can substantially affect the productivity of scientists and Vakili et al. (2015) 
demonstrate the influence of policy shifts on coauthorship networks. The invalidation of 
gene patents in the U.S. may have created an opportunity for the researchers outside the 
US, particularly those in the countries where gene patents are still in place, to reach out to 
the U.S. scientific network to gain open access to genetic compounds. This potential 
cannot be realized when the only data source for publications is PubMed. Other article 
databases, such as Web of Science and Scopus, provide more detailed information about 
all the paper authors. Matching PubMed data with one of these databases could generate 
data in a more granular level and enable me to address questions about the impact of 
policy shifts on authors and coauthorship networks. This wou;d be a next step for this 
study. 
 Third, basic research in the private sector and its similarities and differences with 
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basic research in universities and governmental agencies have posed research questions 
for the economists of science and scholars of organizational studies. Arora et al. (2015) 
provide documentary evidence showing a decline in the private sector’s basic research. 
They report that while the private sector still benefits from the outcomes of scientific 
discoveries, like patented inventions, its scientific production has decayed in recent 
decades. The causes of such trends can be examined by exploiting policy shifts, like 
Myriad case. Separating the private sector publications from publications in the public 
sector, therefore, can help deepen my understanding of the relationship between patents 
and science. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 This paper explores the impact of patents on a specific type of genomic 
compounds on the follow-on scientific progress. Prior literature on patents and science 
provides mixed theoretical predictions and empirical evidence. Exploiting a natural 
experiment afforded by the U.S. Supreme Court ruling on Myriad case that suddenly and 
surprisingly invalidated patent claims on isolated genes, I investigate the impact of gene 
patents on follow-on publication rates in the U.S. and the World. I pay particular 
attention to the papers published in the scientific journals with high impact factors. 
Although I find modest increases in the aggregate level of publications only in the 
high impact factor journals, my analyses fail to find evidence of any significant change in 
the annual publication rates after the invalidation of isolated gene patents. This failure to 
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find evidence of impact holds for the global publication rates, publications with US-based 
primary authors, and articles with US-based primary authors published in high impact 
factor journals. 
 Moreover, I do not find any significant evidence of gene patents causally 
affecting the researchers’ likelihood of winning research grants or broadening the scope 
of their studies. My analyses show no systematic differences between grant counts or 
Medical Subject Heading (MeSH) counts in the gene-related publications after the 
patents on the isolated genes are withdrawn.  
 This study speaks to a rich literature that explores the associations between formal 
IP rights, most notably patents, and science. I contribute new empirical evidence to the 
debate between the supporters and critics of the science-related implications of the 
current patent system. I echo Walsh et al. (2003) and Sampat and Williams (2018) in not 
finding a systematic negative or positive impact of genetic compound patents on 
scientific growth. This may be due to the general disregard of the scientific community 
for the patents, the leniency of patent owners in exercising their patent rights against 
scientists, or a combination of both (Walsh et al., 2003).  
 Finally, this paper provides policy implications for patents and science. The 
decisions on several recent high-profile cases, including Myriad’s, are made based upon 
the anticipated consequences for scientific growth. In Myriad case hearing, the plaintiffs 
raised concerns about gene patents stifling the progress of science. Five years after the 
ruling, however, this study finds no evidence supporting such a claim. 
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Figure 9. Global DNA-Related Publications in PubMed Database per Year 
 
 
 
Figure 10. DNA-Related Publication Counts by US-based Authors per Year  
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Figure 11. Global Gene-Related Publications Before and After the Ruling 
 
 
 
Figure 12. Gene-Related Publications by US-Based Authors Before and After the Ruling  
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Figure 13. Gene-Related Publications by US-Based Authors in High Impact Factor Journals 
Before and After the Ruling 
 
 
 
Figure 14. Research Grants Received by US-Based Authors for Gene-Related Publications 
Before and After the Ruling  
  
120 
 
Figure 15. Research Grants Received by US-Based Authors for Gene-Related Publications 
in High Impact Factor Journals Before and After the Ruling 
 
 
Figure 16. Medical Subject Headings (MeSH) in Gene-Related Publications by US-Based 
Authors Before and After the Ruling 
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Figure 17. Medical Subject Headings (MeSH) in Gene-Related Publications by US-Based 
Authors in High Impact Factor Journals Before and After the Ruling  
  
122 
Rank Journal Title 
Impact Factor 
(Thompson et 
al., 2018) 
DNA-related 
Publication 
Count 
1 Molecular cell 14.033 321 
2 Science (New York, N.Y.) 30.028 250 
3 Nature 26.681 239 
4 Cell 29.194 161 
5 Genes & development 15.05 144 
6 Genome research 10.256 92 
7 Nature structural & molecular biology 11.502 91 
8 Nature genetics 24.176 76 
9 Developmental cell 13.523 69 
10 The EMBO journal 10.086 64 
11 Nature methods 14.959 63 
12 Gastroenterology 12.457 59 
13 The Journal of experimental medicine 14.484 57 
14 Blood 10.37 54 
15 Cancer cell 24.077 52 
16 The Journal of cell biology 10.152 51 
17 Nature cell biology 18.485 49 
18 The New England journal of medicine 51.296 47 
19 Angewandte Chemie (International ed. in 
English) 
10.232 42 
20 Nature medicine 28.588 42 
21 Nature biotechnology 22.672 40 
22 Cell metabolism 16.71 39 
23 Current biology : CB 10.988 39 
24 Immunity 18.306 38 
25 JAMA 23.175 38 
26 The Journal of clinical investigation 15.754 38 
27 Neuron 13.894 35 
28 Current opinion in genetics & 
development 
10.006 32 
29 Trends in biochemical sciences 13.863 32 
30 Nature chemical biology 12.409 30 
Table 16. Top-30 Journals with the Highest Number of DNA-Related Publications by US-
based Authors  
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VARIABLE Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Treated 42,960 0.95 0.20 0 1 
Year 42,960 2013.5 2.29 2010 2017 
Global Pubs. 42,960 2.04 14.53 0 491 
Pubs. with US-Based 
Authors 
42,960 0.28 2.86 0 190 
Pubs. with US-Based 
Authors in High Impact 
Factor Journals 
42,960 0.04 0.61 0 49 
Grants 42,960 0.25 2.62 0 180 
Medical Subject 
Headings (MeSH) 
42,960 5.60 45.24 0 2,816 
 
Table 17. Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
 
(1) 
Poisson 
 
(2) 
Poisson 
 
(3) 
Poisson 
VARIABLES Global Publications 
Publications by  
US-Based 
Authors 
Publications by  
US-Based Authors 
in High Impact 
Factor Journals 
    
Treated 0.166 0.118 0.498** 
 (0.133) 
 
(0.163) (0.204) 
 
Gene fixed-effects 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes 
Time dummies Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
Observations 24,936 10,736 3,232 
Number of genes 3,117 1,342 404 
Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
• Standard errors are clustered at the gene level 
 
Table 18. Gene-related Publication Count  
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(1) 
Poisson 
 
(2) 
Poisson 
VARIABLES 
Grants Received by  
US-Based Authors 
Grants Received by  
US-Based Authors 
Published in High 
Impact Factor Journals 
   
Treated 0.109 0.476** 
 (0.196) (0.220) 
 
Gene fixed-effects Yes 
 
Yes 
Time dummies Yes Yes 
Observations 10,120 3,152 
Number of genes 1,265 394 
Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
• Standard errors are clustered at the gene level 
 
Table 19. Gene-related Publications that Received Grants  
 
 
 
 
(1) 
Poisson 
 
(2) 
Poisson 
VARIABLES 
MeSH in Publications 
by US-Based Authors 
MeSH in Publications by  
US-Based Authors in 
High Impact Factor 
Journals 
   
Treated 0.135 0.481** 
 (0.149) (0.205) 
 
Gene fixed-effects Yes 
 
Yes 
Time dummies Yes Yes 
Observations 10,736 3,232 
Number of genes 1,342 404 
Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
• Standard errors are clustered at the gene level 
 
Table 20. Medical Subject Heading (MeSH) Count
  
1
2
5
 
     Elite Genes   Critical Genes   Non-critical Genes 
 
 
(1) 
Poisson 
 
(2) 
Poisson 
 
(3) 
Poisson 
 (4) 
Poisson 
 
(5) 
Poisson 
 
(6) 
Poisson 
 (7) 
Poisson 
 
(8) 
Poisson 
 
(9) 
Poisson 
VARIABLES 
Publications 
by  
US-Based 
Authors Grants MeSHs 
 Publications 
by  
US-Based 
Authors Grants MeSHs 
 Publications 
by  
US-Based 
Authors Grants MeSHs 
            
Treated 0.076 0.081 0.101  -0.112 -0.471 -0.031  1.503 1.964* 2.021* 
 (0.169) 
 
(0.202) (0.155)  (0.323) (0.485) (0.341)  (1.061) (1.073) (1.043) 
 
Gene fixed-effects 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes 
  
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
  
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Time dummies Yes 
 
Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5,992 2,056 5,992  4,184 1,048 3,888  560 504 560 
Number of genes 749 257 749  523 131 486  70 63 70 
Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
• Standard errors are clustered at the gene level 
 
Table 21. Heterogeneous Gene Scientific Values 
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(1) 
Negative Binomial 
 
(2) 
Negative 
Binomial 
 
(3) 
Negative Binomial 
VARIABLES Global Publications 
Publications 
by  
US-Based 
Authors 
Publications by  
US-Based Authors 
in High Impact 
Factor Journals 
    
Treated 0.040 -0.173 0.411 
 (0.048) 
 
(0.146) (0.311) 
 
Gene fixed-effects 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes 
Time dummies Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
Observations 24,936 10,736 3,232 
Number of genes 3,117 1,342 404 
Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 22. Gene-related Publication Count (Robustness Check) 
 
 
 
 
(1) 
Negative Binomial 
 
(2) 
Negative Binomial 
VARIABLES 
Grants Received by  
US-Based Authors 
Grants Received by  
US-Based Authors 
Published in High 
Impact Factor Journals 
   
Treated -0.220 0.377 
 (0.163) (0.325) 
 
Gene fixed-effects Yes 
 
Yes 
Time dummies Yes Yes 
Observations 10,120 3,152 
Number of genes 1,265 394 
Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 23. Gene-related Publications that Received Grants (Robustness Check)  
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(1) 
Negative Binomial 
 
(2) 
Negative Binomial 
VARIABLES 
MeSH in Publications 
by US-Based Authors 
MeSH in Publications by  
US-Based Authors in 
High Impact Factor 
Journals 
   
Treated -0.196* -0.128 
 (0.118) (0.240) 
 
Gene fixed-effects Yes 
 
Yes 
Time dummies Yes Yes 
Observations 10,736 3,232 
Number of genes 1,342 404 
Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 24. Medical Subject Heading (MeSH) Count (Robustness Check)  
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APPENDIX A 
 This appendix summarizes the data collection procedure for this paper. I show the 
schematic characterization of this process in Figure A1. In what follows, I present further 
explanations on each used database and specific details about the data assembling 
process. 
 
Gene Patents 
To assemble the data set used in this paper, the first step is to collect the entire population 
of patented human genomic compounds. Following Jensen and Murray (2005), I use a 
particular feature of these patents that contain genomic sequences: The United States 
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) mandates the patent applicants that file gene 
patent applications to attach the corresponding genomic sequences to the patent 
document and refer to them in the standard format of “SEQ ID NO”. Moreover, since 
1990, the USPTO sends the genomic sequences attached to the granted patents to the 
National Center for Biotechnology Information (NCBI). Therefore, the NCBI maintains a 
relatively complete and regularly updated database of genomic sequences mentioned in 
the U.S. patent documents, at least since 1990. 
 I exploit this feature to download the entire set of genomic sequences in the NCBI 
database, comprised of human and non-human DNA compounds. To limit the sample to 
the human DNA, I use a standard bioinformatics algorithm called Basic Local Alignment 
Search Tool (BLAST) and align each downloaded sequence with NCBI's human 
messenger RNA (mRNA) database. It results in the identification of 1) the human gene 
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sequences, 2) their corresponding gene symbols, and 3) an alignment E-value that is 
equal to zero for precisely aligned sequences and larger if the alignment is not exact. To 
increase the precision of my data collection, I select only the aligned sequences with zero 
E-values. This procedure creates the population of genomic sequences attached to U.S. 
patent documents that BLAST precisely aligns with the human DNA  
 The assembled database, however, is still not complete for our use. The USPTO 
requires patent applicants to attach genomic sequences wherever they are mentioned in 
the patent document, even if not in the patent claims. For this study, it is key to identify 
the sequences that are mentioned in the patent claims and confer enforceable IP rights to 
the patent owner. Therefore, I download the text of patent claims from the USPTO 
website, select those with the “SEQ ID NO” phrase, and merge them with the gene 
sequence data set. The result comprises of patent-claimed human genomic compounds. It 
is worth mentioning that sequence ID numbers in patent claims are not in standard 
formats and could be connected with “-”, “and”, “or”, and “\”. To assure that my data set 
is comprehensive, I use standard text analysis procedures to extract the entire set of 
claimed sequences. 
 Finally, I group the genes with cDNA patent claims and those with no cDNA 
claims into the control and treatment groups, respectively. In the control group, I only 
retain those patents that are not yet expired at the time of data collection. For the 
treatment group, I allow patent expiration. 
 
  
130 
Gene-based Diagnostic Tests 
In this study, I analyze the data at the gene level and my primary outcome variable is the 
annual number of gene-based diagnostic tests in the US. NCBI's Genetic Testing Registry 
(GTR) provides detailed information on genetic tests along with their providers, methods 
of testing, and test development dates, among others. Although submitting genetic tests to 
the GTR is voluntary, this database provides relatively thorough data on the available 
genetic tests, such that the website www.genetests.org which was the primary source of 
genetic test data in prior studies (e.g., Williams, 2013; Sampat and Williams, 2019) 
discontinued its activities and now directs users to the NCBI's GTR for more thorough 
data. I combine the gene patent database with these diagnostics data to compare the 
development patterns between the treatment and control groups. To make sure I measure 
innovation and not “me-too” products, in my outcome variable data set, I only consider 
the genetic tests that developed new methods of testing for each gene. 
 I also use the establishment date of the diagnostic firm as a proxy for organization 
type, i.e., entrepreneurial or established, and following Agarwal, Ganco, and Ziedonis 
(2009) use five years from the establishment date as the threshold for assigning the firms 
to the entrepreneurial and established groups. 
 
Central and Peripheral Markets 
To separate the genes associated with central markets from those connected to peripheral 
markets, my strategy is to explore the Disability-Adjusted Life Years (DALYs) 
corresponding to the gene's associated diseases. For each gene, I calculate the sum of 
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DALYs for each genetic disease and group them into two categories: I include the genes 
that have DALYs with logs equal to or higher than the median (non-zero) into the Central 
market category and those with logs below the median into the peripheral market group. 
Since there is no straightforward way to create this data set, I write a script to collect data 
from three different sources and combine them. The script first downloads all the diseases 
with their DALYs from the World Health Organization's (WHO) website. Next, it uses 
the database provided by www.malacards.org to identify the gene mutations that may 
potentially contribute to these diseases. Finally, it sums all the disease DALYs per gene 
and delivers the expected output for central and peripheral markets.  
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Figure A1. Schematic Characterization of the data set Assembling Process  
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APPENDIX B 
Table B1. Public Gene Patent Owner Companies at the Time of the Myriad Case 
Public Company Names 
Abbvie Inc Emergent Biosolutions Inc Osiris Therapeutics Inc 
Acceleron Pharma Inc Exelixis Inc Pdl Biopharma Inc 
Alexion Pharmaceuticals Inc Fibrogen Inc Perkinelmer Inc 
Alnylam Pharmaceuticals Inc Five Prime Therapeutics Inc Portola Pharmaceuticals Inc 
Amgen Inc Genesis Healthcare Inc Procter & Gamble Co 
Amicus Therapeutics Inc Genomic Health Inc Protalix Biotherapeutics Inc 
Arca Biopharma Inc Geron Corp Ptc Therapeutics Inc 
Arena Pharmaceuticals Inc Glaxosmithkline Plc Qiagen Nv 
Argos Therapeutics Inc Halozyme Therapeutics Inc Quest Diagnostics Inc 
Arrowhead Pharmaceuticals Heska Corp Regeneron Pharmaceuticals 
Athersys Inc Histogenics Corp Repligen Corp 
Baxter International Inc Horizon Pharma Plc Rigel Pharmaceuticals Inc 
Biogen Inc Idera Pharmaceuticals Inc Sesen Bio Inc 
Catalyst Biosciences Inc Immunomedics Inc Sony Corp 
Celldex Therapeutics Inc Incyte Corp Sorrento Therapeutics Inc 
Codexis Inc Ionis Pharmaceuticals Inc Stryker Corp 
Compugen Ltd Kimberly-Clark Corp Surmodics Inc 
Conatus Pharmaceuticals Inc Laboratory Corporation of 
America Holdings 
Theravance Biopharma Inc 
Curis Inc Lexicon Pharmaceuticals Inc Xenon Pharmaceuticals Inc 
Cytokinetics Inc Myriad Genetics Inc Xoma Corp 
Diadexus Inc Opko Health Inc 
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